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Intellectual Property as a Bargaining Environment

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  • Joseph Farrell
Abstract
Intellectual property policy relies on bargaining in the shadow of exclusivity. But bargaining is generically less than fully efficient, and the bargaining that would be needed to reach efficient arrangements in the shadow of exclusivity may be especially difficult in certain ways. I explore these issues and illustrate with brief discussions of patent pools and standards organizations, among others.

Suggested Citation

  • Joseph Farrell, 2009. "Intellectual Property as a Bargaining Environment," Innovation Policy and the Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 9(1), pages 39-53.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:ipolec:doi:10.1086/592420
    DOI: 10.1086/592420
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