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Transfer Fee Regulations and Player Development

Author

Listed:
  • Marko Terviö
Abstract
This paper studies the role of transfer fees in professional sports, where players can commit to binding long-term contracts. They cannot switch clubs before their contract expires unless the old club agrees to let them go; the transfer fee is the price of that agreement. Transfer fees have been defended as a necessary incentive for clubs to invest in training their young players. The apparent absence of significant training costs (compared to the level of transfer fees) has undermined this defense. We present a model without training where an industry of clubs with heterogeneous marginal revenue products for player ability and a population of players with various levels of talent and experience match. Transfer fees are needed to allocate scarce playing opportunities efficiently among players of different levels of known and potential ability. We show that total surplus is lower without transfer fees because playing time gets reallocated towards older players with less upside potential. The resulting increase in player salaries exceeds the transfer fee costs for each level of ability. (JEL: J31, J41, K12, L83) (c) 2006 by the European Economic Association.

Suggested Citation

  • Marko Terviö, 2006. "Transfer Fee Regulations and Player Development," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 4(5), pages 957-987, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:tpr:jeurec:v:4:y:2006:i:5:p:957-987
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bernd Frick, 2009. "Globalization and Factor Mobility," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 10(1), pages 88-106, February.
    2. Green, Colin & Lozano, Fernando & Simmons, Rob, 2015. "Rank-order tournaments, probability of winning and investing in talent: evidence from champions' league qualifying rules," National Institute Economic Review, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, vol. 232, pages 30-40, May.
    3. Hoey, Sam & Peeters, Thomas & Principe, Francesco, 2021. "The transfer system in European football: A pro-competitive no-poaching agreement?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
    4. David Boto‐García & Carlos Varela‐Quintana & Alvaro Muñiz, 2023. "Foreign players, team production, and technical efficiency: Evidence from European soccer," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 75(4), pages 1209-1241, October.
    5. Eunhee Kim, 2024. "Repeated matching, career concerns, and firm size," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 142(1), pages 45-80, June.
    6. Norbäck, Pehr-Johan & Olsson, Martin & Persson, Lars, 2016. "Talent Development and Labour Market Integration: The Case of EU Football," Working Paper Series 1126, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 14 Mar 2018.
    7. Pehr‐Johan Norbäck & Martin Olsson & Lars Persson, 2021. "Talent development and labour market integration in European football," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(2), pages 367-408, February.
    8. Bergantiños, Gustavo & Moreno-Ternero, Juan D., 2021. "Compromising to share the revenues from broadcasting sports leagues," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 57-74.
    9. Henrik Jacobsen Kleven & Camille Landais & Emmanuel Saez, 2013. "Taxation and International Migration of Superstars: Evidence from the European Football Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(5), pages 1892-1924, August.
    10. Amand, Marnix & Chéron, Arnaud & Pelgrin, Florian & Terriau, Anthony, 2023. "Soccer labour market equilibrium and efficient training of players," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 156(C).
    11. Eberhard Feess & Michael Gerfin & Gerd Muehlheusser, 2015. "Contracts As Rent‐Seeking Devices: Evidence From German Soccer," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 53(1), pages 714-730, January.
    12. Babatunde Buraimo & Bernd Frick & Michael Hickfang & Rob Simmons, 2015. "The Economics of Long-term Contracts in the Footballers' Labour Market," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 62(1), pages 8-24, February.
    13. Müller, Michael, 2015. "Leiharbeit im Profifußball: Sind Leihspieler stärker motiviert?," Discussion Papers of the Institute for Organisational Economics 6/2015, University of Münster, Institute for Organisational Economics.
    14. Guimaraes, Bernardo & Cordeiro De Noronha Pessoa, Joao Paulo & Ponczek, Vladimir, 2021. "Non-compete agreements, wages and efficiency: theory and evidence from Brazilian football," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 114417, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    15. Thomas (T.L.P.R.) Peeters & Stefan Szymanski & Marko Terviö, 2017. "The inefficient advantage of experience in the market for football managers," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 17-116/VII, Tinbergen Institute.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
    • K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
    • L83 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Sports; Gambling; Restaurants; Recreation; Tourism

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