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Simple bets to elicit private signals

Author

Listed:
  • Baillon, Aurelien

    (Erasmus School of Economics, Erasmus University Rotterdam)

  • Xu, Yan

    (Department of Economics, University of Vienna)

Abstract
This paper introduces two simple betting mechanisms, Top-Flop and Threshold betting, to elicit unverifiable information from crowds. Agents are offered bets on the rating of an item about which they received a private signal versus that of a random item. We characterize conditions for the chosen bet to reveal the agents' private signal even if the underlying ratings are biased. We further provide micro-economic foundations of the ratings, which are endogenously determined by the actions of other agents in a game setting. Our mechanisms relax standard assumptions of the literature, such as common prior, and homogeneous and risk neutral agents.

Suggested Citation

  • Baillon, Aurelien & Xu, Yan, 2021. "Simple bets to elicit private signals," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 16(3), July.
    • Handle: RePEc:the:publsh:4343
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    File URL: http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/viewFile/20210777/31435/890
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ewa Zawojska & Michał Krawczyk, 2022. "Incentivizing stated preference elicitation with choice-matching in the field," Working Papers 2022-04, Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw.
    2. Bergemann, Dirk & Ottaviani, Marco, 2021. "Information Markets and Nonmarkets," CEPR Discussion Papers 16459, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bets; private signals; Bayesian game; elicitation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
    • C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments

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