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Clearinghouses for two‐sided matching: An experimental study

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  • Federico Echenique
  • Alistair J. Wilson
  • Leeat Yariv
Abstract
We experimentally study the Gale and Shapley, 1962 mechanism, which is utilized in a wide set of applications, most prominently the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP). Several insights come out of our analysis. First, only 48% of our observed outcomes are stable, and among those a large majority culminate at the receiver‐optimal stable matching. Second, receivers rarely truncate their true preferences: it is the proposers who do not make offers in order of their preference, frequently skipping potential partners. Third, market characteristics affect behavior: both the cardinal representation and core size influence whether laboratory outcomes are stable. We conclude by using our controlled results and a behavioral model to shed light on a number of stylized facts we derive from new NRMP survey and outcome data, and to explain the small cores previously documented for the NRMP.

Suggested Citation

  • Federico Echenique & Alistair J. Wilson & Leeat Yariv, 2016. "Clearinghouses for two‐sided matching: An experimental study," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(2), pages 449-482, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:quante:v:7:y:2016:i:2:p:449-482
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