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CEO pay, firm size, and corporate performance: evidence from Canada

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  • Xianming Zhou
Abstract
Executive compensation of 755 Canadian firms is examined over the period 1991–95, and evidence is obtained consistent with previous studies: CEO pay rises with firm size and compensation is tied to company performance. In addition, executives in utilities earn lower pay, and their compensation is less responsive to performance, than is true for their counterparts in other industries. Some novel findings are also documented. First, the sales elasticity of CEO compensation is greater in larger firms. Second, while CEO turnover probability is generally negatively related to the firm's stock performance, the threat of dismissal appear to be less pronounced in small firms. JEL Classification: G35, J33 Salaire des PDG, taille de l'entreprise et performance des sociétés: résultats pour le Canada. En étudiant le salaire des PDG de 755 entreprises canadiennes au cours de la période 1991–95, l'auteur confirme certains résultats d'études antérieures: le salaire du PDG croît avec la taille de l'entreprise, et il est liéà la performance de l'entreprise. Il appert aussi que les cadres dans les entreprises de service public gagnent moins relativement parlant, et que leur salaire est moins sensible aux écarts de performance que dans les autres secteurs. On met aussi à jour certains résultats inédits. D'abord, il semble que l'élasticité du salaire du PDG par rapport au niveau des ventes est plus forte dans les plus grandes entreprises. Ensuite, alors que la probabilité de roulement est en général co‐reliée négativement à la performance des actions en bourse de l'entreprise, la menace de renvoi semble moins prononcée dans les petites entreprises.

Suggested Citation

  • Xianming Zhou, 2000. "CEO pay, firm size, and corporate performance: evidence from Canada," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 33(1), pages 213-251, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:canjec:v:33:y:2000:i:1:p:213-251
    DOI: 10.1111/0008-4085.00013
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G35 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Payout Policy
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods

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