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Approval quorums dominate participation quorums

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  • François Maniquet
  • Massimo Morelli
Abstract
We study direct democracy with population uncertainty. Voters’ participation is often among the desiderata by the election designer. We show that with a participation quorum, i.e. a threshold on the fraction of participating voters below which the status quo is kept, the status quo may be kept in situations where the planner would prefer the reform, or the reform is passed when the planner prefers the status quo. On the other hand, using an approval quorum, i.e. a threshold on the number of voters expressing a ballot in favor of the reform below which the status quo is kept, we show that those drawbacks of participation quorums are avoided. Moreover, an electoral system with approval quorum performs better than one with participation quorum even when the planner wishes to implement the corresponding participation quorum social choice function. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

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  • François Maniquet & Massimo Morelli, 2015. "Approval quorums dominate participation quorums," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(1), pages 1-27, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:45:y:2015:i:1:p:1-27
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-014-0804-0
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    3. Michela Chessa & Vito Fragnelli, 2022. "The Italian referendum: what can we get from game theory?," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 318(2), pages 849-869, November.
    4. Matveenko, Andrei & Valei, Azamat & Vorobyev, Dmitriy, 2022. "Participation quorum when voting is costly," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    5. Boris Ginzburg, 2023. "Slacktivism," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 35(2), pages 126-143, April.
    6. Alaitz Artabe & Annick Laruelle & Federico Valenciano, 2012. "Preferences, actions and voting rules," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 3(1), pages 15-28, March.
      • Artabe Echevarria, Alaitz & Laruelle, Annick & Valenciano Llovera, Federico, 2011. "Preferences, actions and voting rules," IKERLANAK info:eu-repo/grantAgreeme, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
    7. Cristina Pardo-Garcia & Jose Sempere-Monerris, 2015. "Equilibrium mergers in a composite good industry with efficiencies," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 6(1), pages 101-127, March.
    8. Rolando Herrero, 2017. "Integrating HEC with circuit breakers and multipath RTP to improve RTC media quality," Telecommunication Systems: Modelling, Analysis, Design and Management, Springer, vol. 64(1), pages 211-221, January.
    9. Patricia Charléty & Marie-Cécile Fagart & Saïd Souam, 2017. "Quorum Rules and Shareholder Power," EconomiX Working Papers 2017-35, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    10. Paul Belleflamme & Paul Bloch, 2013. "Dynamic Protection of Innovations through Patents and Trade Secrets," CESifo Working Paper Series 4486, CESifo.
    11. David Altman, 2017. "The Potential of Direct Democracy: A Global Measure (1900–2014)," Social Indicators Research: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal for Quality-of-Life Measurement, Springer, vol. 133(3), pages 1207-1227, September.
    12. Marc Pauly, 2013. "Characterizing referenda with quorums via strategy-proofness," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 75(4), pages 581-597, October.
    13. De Sinopoli, Francesco & Meroni, Claudia & Pimienta, Carlos, 2014. "Strategic stability in Poisson games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 46-63.
    14. RUSSO, Federica & MOUCHART, Michel & WUNSCH, Guillaume, 2013. "Confounding and control in a multivariate system. An issue in causal attribution," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2013068, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    15. Annick Laruelle & Federico Valenciano, 2011. "Majorities with a quorum," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 23(2), pages 241-259, April.
    16. Hans Peter Grüner & Thomas Tröger, 2019. "Linear Voting Rules," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 87(6), pages 2037-2077, November.
    17. Terzopoulou, Zoi, 2020. "Quota rules for incomplete judgments," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 23-36.
    18. Annick Laruelle & Federico Valenciano, 2012. "Quaternary dichotomous voting rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 38(3), pages 431-454, March.
    19. DI SUMMA, Marco, 2013. "The convex hull of the all-different system with the inclusion property: a simple proof," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2013069, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    20. Sabine Flamand & Orestis Troumpounis, 2014. "Participation quorums in costly meetings," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 159(1), pages 53-62, April.
    21. Patricia Charléty & Marie-Cécile Fagart & Saïd Souam, 2017. "Quorum Rules and Shareholder Power," Working Papers hal-04141634, HAL.
    22. Dmitriy Vorobyev & Azamat Valei & Andrei Matveenko, 2023. "Approval vs. Participation Quorums," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2023_438, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.

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