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Uncovering some subtleties of the uncovered set: Social choice theory and distributive politics

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  • David Epstein

    (Department of Political Science, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027, USA)

Abstract
Although the uncovered set has occupied a prominent role in social choice theory, its exact shape has never been determined in a general setting. This paper calculates the uncovered set when actors have pork barrel, or purely distributive, preferences, and shows that in this setting nearly the entire Pareto set is uncovered. The result casts doubt on the usefulness of the uncovered set as a general solution concept and suggests that to predict the distribution of political benefits one must explicitly model the institutions that structure collective choice.

Suggested Citation

  • David Epstein, 1997. "Uncovering some subtleties of the uncovered set: Social choice theory and distributive politics," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(1), pages 81-93.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:15:y:1997:i:1:p:81-93
    Note: Received: 29 April 1993/Accepted: 28 June 1996
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    Cited by:

    1. William T. Bianco & Christopher Kam & Itai Sened & Regina A. Smyth, 2015. "The uncovered set and its applications," Chapters, in: Jac C. Heckelman & Nicholas R. Miller (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Voting, chapter 19, pages 347-366, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. De Donder, Philippe & Hindriks, Jean, 2003. "The politics of progressive income taxation with incentive effects," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(11), pages 2491-2505, October.
    3. Jean-Michel Grandmont, 2004. "Fiscally Stable Income Distributions under Majority Voting and Bargaining Sets," Working Papers 2004-18, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    4. De Donder, Philippe & Hindriks, Jean, 2003. "The politics of progressive income taxation with incentive effects," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(11), pages 2491-2505, October.

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