Regret Matching with Finite Memory
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DOI: 10.1007/s13235-011-0021-8
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Other versions of this item:
- Rene Saran & Roberto Serrano, 2010. "Regret matching with finite memory," Working Papers 2010-10, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
- Rene Saran & Roberto Serrano, 2010. "Regret Matching with Finite Memory," Working Papers 2010-10, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Saran, R.R.S. & Serrano, R., 2010. "Regret matching with finite memory," Research Memorandum 033, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Rene Saran & Roberto Serrano, 2010. "Regret Matching with Finite Memory," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000078, David K. Levine.
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Cited by:
- Damjanovic, Vladislav, 2017.
"Two “little treasure games” driven by unconditional regret,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 99-103.
- Vladislav Damjanovic, 2016. "Two "Little Treasure Games" driven by Unconditional Regret," CEMAP Working Papers 2016_06, Durham University Business School.
- Saran, R.R.S. & Serrano, R., 2010.
"Ex-Post regret learning in games with fixed and random matching: the case of private values,"
Research Memorandum
032, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Rene Saran & Roberto Serrano, 2010. "Ex-Post Regret Learning in Games with Fixed and Random Matching: The Case of Private Values," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000083, David K. Levine.
- Rene Saran & Roberto Serrano, 2010. "Ex-Post Regret Learning in Games with Fixed and Random Matching: The Case of Private Values," Working Papers 2010-11, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Rene Saran & Roberto Serrano, 2010. "Ex-post regret learning in games with fixed and random matching: The case of private values," Working Papers 2010-11, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
- Saran, Rene & Serrano, Roberto, 2014. "Ex-post regret heuristics under private values (I): Fixed and random matching," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 97-111.
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More about this item
Keywords
Regret matching; Nash equilibria; Closed sets under same or better replies; Correlated equilibria;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Statistics
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