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Success Versus Decisiveness

Author

Listed:
  • Annick Laruelle

    (Department of Economics, University of Alicante, laruelle@merlin.fae.ua.es)

  • Ricardo Martınez

    (Department of Economics, University of Alicante, rmartinez@merlin.fae.ua.es)

  • Federico Valenciano

    (Department of Applied Economics IV, University of the Basque Country, elpvallf@bs.ehu.es)

Abstract
In this article, we vindicate the relevance of the notion of success or satisfaction for the normative assessment of voting rules. We provide arguments in support of this view and emphasize the conceptual and analytical differences between this notion and that of decisiveness. The conclusions are illustrated in the case study provided by three different voting rules that have been proposed for the Council of Ministers of the European Union.

Suggested Citation

  • Annick Laruelle & Ricardo Martınez & Federico Valenciano, 2006. "Success Versus Decisiveness," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 18(2), pages 185-205, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:18:y:2006:i:2:p:185-205
    DOI: 10.1177/0951629806061866
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Annick Laruelle & Federico Valenciano, 2005. "Assessing success and decisiveness in voting situations," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 24(1), pages 171-197, January.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Laurent, Thibault & Le Breton, Michel & Lepelley, Dominique & de Mouzon, Olivier, 2017. "Exploring the Effects on the Electoral College of National and Regional Popular Vote Interstate Compact: An Electoral Engineering Perspective," TSE Working Papers 17-861, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised May 2018.
    2. Josep Freixas & Montserrat Pons, 2017. "Using the Multilinear Extension to Study Some Probabilistic Power Indices," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 437-452, May.
    3. Laruelle, Annick & Valenciano, Federico, 2008. "Noncooperative foundations of bargaining power in committees and the Shapley-Shubik index," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 341-353, May.
    4. Freixas, Josep, 2012. "Probabilistic power indices for voting rules with abstention," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 89-99.
    5. Olivier Mouzon & Thibault Laurent & Michel Breton & Dominique Lepelley, 2019. "Exploring the effects of national and regional popular vote Interstate compact on a toy symmetric version of the Electoral College: an electoral engineering perspective," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 179(1), pages 51-95, April.
    6. Ibarzabal, Nora & Laruelle, Annick, 2018. "Ghost seats in parliaments," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 264(1), pages 354-363.
    7. Josep Freixas & Montserrat Pons, 2015. "Success and decisiveness on proper symmetric games," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 23(4), pages 779-794, December.
    8. Alaitz Artabe & Annick Laruelle & Federico Valenciano, 2012. "Preferences, actions and voting rules," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 3(1), pages 15-28, March.
      • Artabe Echevarria, Alaitz & Laruelle, Annick & Valenciano Llovera, Federico, 2011. "Preferences, actions and voting rules," IKERLANAK info:eu-repo/grantAgreeme, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
    9. Pongou, Roland & Tchantcho, Bertrand, 2021. "Round-robin political tournaments: Abstention, truthful equilibria, and effective power," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 331-351.
    10. Le Breton, Michel & Lepelley, Dominique & Macé, Antonin & Merlin, Vincent, 2017. "Le mécanisme optimal de vote au sein du conseil des représentants d’un système fédéral," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 93(1-2), pages 203-248, Mars-Juin.
    11. Annick Laruelle & Federico Valenciano, 2008. "Bargaining in Committees of Representatives," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 20(1), pages 93-106, January.
    12. Freixas, Josep & Pons, Montserrat, 2008. "Circumstantial power: Optimal persuadable voters," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 186(3), pages 1114-1126, May.
    13. René van den Brink & Frank Steffen, 2012. "On the Measurement of Success and Satisfaction," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-030/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    14. Elisabetta Croci Angelini, 2007. "Resisting Globalization: Voting Power Indices and the National Interest in the EU Decision-making," Working Papers 08-2007, Macerata University, Department of Studies on Economic Development (DiSSE), revised Feb 2009.
    15. Ibarzabal Laka, Nora & Laruelle, Annick, 2015. "Ghost seats in the Basque Parliament," IKERLANAK info:eu-repo/grantAgreeme, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
    16. Alexander Mayer & Stefan Napel, 2020. "Weighted voting on the IMF Managing Director," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 21(3), pages 237-244, September.
    17. Michel Breton & Karine Straeten, 2015. "Influence versus utility in the evaluation of voting rules: a new look at the Penrose formula," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 165(1), pages 103-122, October.

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