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On Hierarchical Spatial Competition

Author

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  • Shlomo Weber
Abstract
In this paper we consider a hierarchical model of spatial electoral competition with two dominant players (incumbents) and one entrant. The incumbents engage in a non-cooperative game against each other and act as Stackelberg leaders with respect to a vote-maximizing entrant. We prove that the equilibrium of this game, called a hierarchical equilibrium, exists and is unique for an arbitrary single-peaked distribution of voters' ideal points. Moreover, we fully characterize the set of equilibrium strategies and show its equivalence to the set of strategies generated by a perfect-foresight equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Shlomo Weber, 1992. "On Hierarchical Spatial Competition," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 59(2), pages 407-425.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:59:y:1992:i:2:p:407-425.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/2297961
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Tsakas, Nikolas & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2018. "Electoral competition with third party entry in the lab," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 148(C), pages 121-134.
    2. Arnaud Dellis, 2022. "Does Party Polarization Affect the Electoral Prospects of a New Centrist Candidate?," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(4), pages 1-20, July.
    3. Haimanko, Ori & Le Breton, Michel & Weber, Shlomo, 2005. "Transfers in a polarized country: bridging the gap between efficiency and stability," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(7), pages 1277-1303, July.
    4. K. Terai, 2003. "Electoral alliance and implemented redistribution: an interpretation on non-competitive politics of Japan," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 10(4), pages 235-238.
    5. Dimitrios Xefteris, 2018. "Candidate valence in a spatial model with entry," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 176(3), pages 341-359, September.
    6. Osborne, Martin J., 2000. "Entry-deterring policy differentiation by electoral candidates," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 41-62, July.
    7. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2007. "Policy convergence under approval and plurality voting: the role of policy commitment," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 29(2), pages 229-245, September.
    8. Arnaud Dellis & Alexandre Gauthier-Belzile & Mandar Oak, 2017. "Policy Polarization and Strategic Candidacy in Elections under the Alternative-Vote Rule," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 173(4), pages 565-590, December.
    9. Michel Le Breton & Shlomo Weber, 2003. "The Art of Making Everybody Happy: How to Prevent a Secession," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 50(3), pages 1-4.
    10. Zakharov Alexei, 2005. "Candidate location and endogenous valence," EERC Working Paper Series 05-17e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS.
    11. Geoffrey Brennan & Alan Hamlin, 1998. "Expressive voting and electoral equilibrium," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 95(1), pages 149-175, April.
    12. Stefan Lutz, 1997. "Vertical product differentiation and entry deterrence," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 65(1), pages 79-102, February.
    13. Bernhardt, Dan & Krasa, Stefan & Squintani, Francesco, 2024. "Political Competition and Strategic Voting in Multi-Candidate Elections," QAPEC Discussion Papers 21, Quantitative and Analytical Political Economy Research Centre.
    14. Arnaud Dellis, 2013. "The two-party system under alternative voting procedures," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(1), pages 263-284, January.
    15. Christian Johansson & Anders Kärnä & Jaakko Meriläinen, 2023. "Vox Populi, Vox Dei? Tacit collusion in politics," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(3), pages 752-772, November.
    16. Paul Redmond, 2017. "Incumbent-challenger and open-seat elections in a spatial model of political competition," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 170(1), pages 79-97, January.
    17. Dellis, Arnaud, 2009. "Would letting people vote for multiple candidates yield policy moderation?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 772-801, March.
    18. Mr. Michel Le Breton & Mr. Shlomo Weber, 2001. "The Art of Making Everybody Happy: How to Prevent a Secession," IMF Working Papers 2001/176, International Monetary Fund.
    19. Alexander Shapoval & Shlomo Weber & Alexei Zakharov, 2019. "Valence influence in electoral competition with rank objectives," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(3), pages 713-753, September.
    20. Takaki, Masaya & Matsubayashi, Nobuo, 2013. "Sequential multi-store location in a duopoly," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 491-506.
    21. Eiselt, H. A. & Laporte, Gilbert, 1997. "Sequential location problems," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 96(2), pages 217-231, January.

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