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Advertising and Product Quality in Posted-Offer Experiments

Author

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  • Holt, Charles A
  • Sherman, Roger
Abstract
Sellers select both price and quality, but buyers have limited information about those choices in the experiments reported here. Market efficiency is high under full information with truthful advertising of prices and qualities, but is much lower with no advertising of price or quality. Efficiency does not improve when sellers were permitted to advertise price, but not quality, and in half of these experiments "lemons" outcomes occur. Although the range of outcomes is great, it cannot be claimed that price advertising improves efficiency when quality is unknown. Copyright 1990 by Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Holt, Charles A & Sherman, Roger, 1990. "Advertising and Product Quality in Posted-Offer Experiments," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 28(1), pages 39-56, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:28:y:1990:i:1:p:39-56
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Cabrales, Antonio & Charness, Gary & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2006. "Competition, hidden information, and efficiency : an experiment," UC3M Working papers. Economics we071909, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    2. John A. List, 2006. "The Behavioralist Meets the Market: Measuring Social Preferences and Reputation Effects in Actual Transactions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(1), pages 1-37, February.
    3. Fabrice Etilé & Sabrina Teyssier, 2012. "Signaling Corporate Social Responsibility: Third-Party Certification vs. Brands," Working Papers halshs-00736551, HAL.
    4. Sören Harrs & Bettina Rockenbach & Lukas M. Wenner, 2022. "Revealing good deeds: disclosure of social responsibility in competitive markets," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(5), pages 1349-1373, November.
    5. Martin Gaynor, 1994. "Issues in the Industrial Organization of the Market for Physician Services," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(1), pages 211-255, March.
    6. Fernandes, Maria Eduarda & Valente, Marieta, 2021. "What you get is not what you paid for: New evidence from a lab experiment on negative externalities and information asymmetries," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 93(C).
    7. Glenn Furton & Adam Martin, 2019. "Beyond market failure and government failure," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 178(1), pages 197-216, January.
    8. Giorgio Coricelli & Luigi Luini, 1999. "Double Moral Hazard: an Experiment on Warranties," CEEL Working Papers 9901, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
    9. Martin POLÍVKA & David MARTINČÍK, 2014. "Measures ensuring the food quality on retail markets: experimental perspective," Agricultural Economics, Czech Academy of Agricultural Sciences, vol. 60(8), pages 343-352.
    10. Burfurd, Ingrid & Gangadharan, Lata & Nemes, Veronika, 2012. "Stars and standards: Energy efficiency in rental markets," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 153-168.
    11. Antonio Cabrales & Gary Charness & Marie Villeval, 2011. "Hidden information, bargaining power, and efficiency: an experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 14(2), pages 133-159, May.
    12. Steffen Huck & Gabriele K. Lünser & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2016. "Price competition and reputation in markets for experience goods: an experimental study," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 47(1), pages 99-117, February.
    13. Mikhail I. Melnik & James Alm, 2005. "Seller Reputation, Information Signals, and Prices for Heterogeneous Coins on eBay," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 72(2), pages 305-328, October.
    14. Alventosa, Adriana & Pacheco Pires, Cesaltina & Ferreira Jorge, Sílvia & Pinho, Joana & Catalão-Lopes, Margarida, 2023. "How does firms’ cost structure affect their quality–price mix? An experimental analysis," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 107(C).
    15. Tape, Jean Georges I.M., 2016. "Analyse des facteurs sources d’adoption de nouvelles technologies rizicoles : une estimation de la réponse de l’offre en Afrique de l’Ouest," 2016 Fifth International Conference, September 23-26, 2016, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 270064, African Association of Agricultural Economists (AAAE).
    16. Bart Wilson & Arthur Zillante, 2010. "More Information, More Ripoffs: Experiments with Public and Private Information in Markets with Asymmetric Information," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 36(1), pages 1-16, February.
    17. Capra, C. Monica & Goeree, Jacob K. & Gomez, Rosario & Holt, Charles A., 2000. "Predation, asymmetric information and strategic behavior in the classroom: an experimental approach to the teaching of industrial organization," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 205-225, January.
    18. repec:hal:pseose:halshs-00736551 is not listed on IDEAS

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