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Incrementality of SME Loan Guarantees

Author

Listed:
  • Allan Riding
  • Judith Madill
  • George Haines
Abstract
In many countries, loan guarantee programs are important elements of government policy with respect to small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). If loan guarantee schemes are to be effective, a majority of firms obtaining assistance through such a scheme ought not to be able to obtain financing from existing sources: a property known as incrementality or additionality. This paper describes a new approach to measuring incrementality. This work uses a two-stage process to estimate the incrementality of loans made under the terms of the Canada Small Business Financing (CSBF) program. First, a logistic regression-based model of loan outcomes (essentially a credit-scoring model) is estimated based on a large representative sample of SMEs. The resulting model was consistent with prior expectations and exhibited high levels of goodness-of-fit. The model was then employed to classify a sample of firms that had received loans under the terms of the loan guarantee scheme. Incremental loans ought to be classified as “turndowns” by the model; hence the proportion of loan guarantee recipients that the model classified as turndowns is a direct measure of incrementality. For the CSBF loan guarantee program incrementality was estimated (with 95% confidence) as 74.8±9.0%. Copyright Springer 2007

Suggested Citation

  • Allan Riding & Judith Madill & George Haines, 2007. "Incrementality of SME Loan Guarantees," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 47-61, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:sbusec:v:29:y:2007:i:1:p:47-61
    DOI: 10.1007/s11187-005-4411-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Riding, Allan L. & HainesJR., George, 2001. "Loan guarantees: Costs of default and benefits to small firms," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 16(6), pages 595-612, November.
    2. Bester, Helmut, 1985. "Screening vs. Rationing in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 850-855, September.
    3. Cowling, Marc & Mitchell, Peter, 2003. "Is the Small Firms Loan Guarantee Scheme Hazardous for Banks or Helpful to Small Business?," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 63-71, August.
    4. Besanko, David & Thakor, Anjan V, 1987. "Collateral and Rationing: Sorting Equilibria in Monopolistic and Competitive Credit Markets," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 28(3), pages 671-689, October.
    5. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1983. "Incentive Effects of Terminations: Applications to the Credit and Labor Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(5), pages 912-927, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    additionality; incrementality; small business; loan guarantees; G18; G28; M13; O17;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • M13 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - New Firms; Startups
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements

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