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More Is Less? Regulation in a Rent Seeking World

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  • Dewey, James F
Abstract
Competition between two interest groups that engage in strategic lobbying to influence regulatory decisions is examined. It is shown that increases in gross surplus can be detrimental to all parties. The circumstances under which this might occur, along with several applications, including the decision to deregulate, are considered. It is also shown that a simultaneous increase in both groups' marginal lobbying costs benefits the low cost group and harms the high cost group. Copyright 2000 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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  • Dewey, James F, 2000. "More Is Less? Regulation in a Rent Seeking World," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 95-112, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:18:y:2000:i:2:p:95-112
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    Cited by:

    1. Mark Armstrong & David E.M. Sappington, 2006. "Regulation, Competition and Liberalization," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(2), pages 325-366, June.

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