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Social Capital and Endogenous Preferences

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  • Anders Poulsen
  • Gert Svendsen
Abstract
In this paper we analyze whether social capital can emerge endogenously from a process of preference evolution. We define social capital as preferences that promote voluntary cooperation in a one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma game. We investigate how the endogenous preferences depend on the amount of information individuals have about each other’s preferences. When there is sufficiently much information, maximal social capital emerges. In general, the level of social capital varies positively with the amount of information. Our results may add to an understanding of the factors that determine a society’s ability to generate cooperative outcomes. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

Suggested Citation

  • Anders Poulsen & Gert Svendsen, 2005. "Social Capital and Endogenous Preferences," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(1), pages 171-196, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:123:y:2005:i:1:p:171-196
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-005-0266-0
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    2. Poulsen, Odile & Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard, 2005. "Love Thy Neighbor: Bonding versus Bridging Trust," Working Papers 05-7, University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics.
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    4. Susanne Jensen & Gert Tinggaard Svendsen, 2016. "Social Trust, Safety and the Choice of Tourist Destination," Business and Management Horizons, Macrothink Institute, vol. 4(1), pages 1-9, June.
    5. Emily Chamlee-Wright & Virgil Storr, 2011. "Social capital, lobbying and community-based interest groups," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 149(1), pages 167-185, October.
    6. Bergh, Andreas & Engseld, Peter, 2005. "The Problem of Cooperation and Reputation Based Choice," Working Papers 2005:27, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 04 May 2006.
    7. Poulsen, Odile & Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard, 2004. "Social Capital and Market Centralisation: A Two-Sector Model," Working Papers 04-12, University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics.
    8. Hernández, José & Guerrero-Luchtenberg, César, 2016. "Social capital, perceptions and economic performance," MPRA Paper 71006, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Edgar Carrera, 2012. "Imitation and evolutionary stability of poverty traps," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 1-20, April.
    10. Cai, Meina & Caskey, Gregory W. & Cowen, Nick & Murtazashvili, Ilia & Murtazashvili, Jennifer Brick & Salahodjaev, Raufhon, 2022. "Individualism, economic freedom, and charitable giving," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 200(C), pages 868-884.
    11. Stefano Dughera & Alain Marciano, 2023. "Inside Buchanan's Samaritan's Dilemma: altruism, strategic courage and ethics of responsibility," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 207-233, June.
    12. Dincer, Oguzhan C. & Fredriksson, Per G., 2018. "Corruption and environmental regulatory policy in the United States: Does trust matter?," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 212-225.
    13. Urs Steiner Brandt & Gert Tinggaard Svendsen, 2019. "How robust is the welfare state when facing open borders? An evolutionary game-theoretic model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 178(1), pages 179-195, January.
    14. Virgil Henry Storr & Stefanie Haeffele-Balch & Laura E. Grube, 2015. "Community Revival in the Wake of Disaster," Perspectives from Social Economics, Palgrave Macmillan, number 978-1-137-31489-5, June.

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