[go: up one dir, main page]
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/ejlwec/v36y2013i2p373-388.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Freedom to bargain and disputes’ resolution

Author

Listed:
  • Yannick Gabuthy
  • Eve-Angéline Lambert
Abstract
When two parties are embedded in a dispute, they generally have the possibility to bargain before an external solution is imposed to them, notably through alternative dispute resolution. This bargaining phase may either result from a choice of disputants to negotiate or be imposed by laws or legal contracts. The aim of this paper is to analyze the differences in terms of parties’ bargaining behavior, depending upon the fact that bargaining has been imposed to them or comes from their own will. We conduct an experimental analysis and find out that, under some conditions, a procedure in which parties are forced to bargain leads to more agreements than when parties are free whether to do so. This main result is interpreted in the light of behavioral economics. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Yannick Gabuthy & Eve-Angéline Lambert, 2013. "Freedom to bargain and disputes’ resolution," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 373-388, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:36:y:2013:i:2:p:373-388
    DOI: 10.1007/s10657-013-9382-3
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10657-013-9382-3
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s10657-013-9382-3?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Gertner, Robert H & Miller, Geoffrey P, 1995. "Settlement Escrows," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(1), pages 87-122, January.
    3. Ashenfelter, Orley, et al, 1992. "An Experimental Comparison of Dispute Rates in Alternative Arbitration Systems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(6), pages 1407-1433, November.
    4. Ashenfelter, Orley, 1987. "Arbitrator Behavior," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(2), pages 342-346, May.
    5. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 2003. "Aligning the Interests of Lawyers and Clients," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 5(1), pages 165-188.
    6. Bruno S. Frey & Reto Jegen, 2001. "Motivation Crowding Theory," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(5), pages 589-611, December.
    7. Muthoo,Abhinay, 1999. "Bargaining Theory with Applications," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521576475, September.
    8. Smith, Vernon L, 1982. "Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental Science," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 923-955, December.
    9. Cary Deck & Amy Farmer & Dao-Zhi Zeng, 2007. "Amended final-offer arbitration over an uncertain value: A comparison with CA and FOA," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(4), pages 439-454, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Lambert, Eve-Angéline & Peterle, Emmanuel & Tisserand, Jean-Christian, 2019. "Pretrial settlement and coercion: An experiment," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Charness, Gary & Kuhn, Peter, 2011. "Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab?," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 3, pages 229-330, Elsevier.
    2. Deck, Cary A. & Thomas, Charles J., 2020. "Using experiments to compare the predictive power of models of multilateral negotiations," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
    3. Lambert, Eve-Angéline & Peterle, Emmanuel & Tisserand, Jean-Christian, 2019. "Pretrial settlement and coercion: An experiment," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    4. Eve-Angéline Lambert & Jean-Christian Tisserand, 2016. "Does the obligation to bargain make you fit the mould? An experimental analysis," Working Papers of BETA 2016-37, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    5. Manzini, Paola & Mariotti, Marco, 2005. "Alliances and negotiations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 121(1), pages 128-141, March.
    6. Simon Hug & Tobias Schulz, 2007. "Referendums in the EU’s constitution building process," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 177-218, June.
    7. Agnieszka Rusinowska & Ahmet Ozkardas, 2015. "On equilibrium payoffs in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 3(2), pages 181-199, October.
    8. Qian, Dong & Guo, Ju’e, 2014. "Research on the energy-saving and revenue sharing strategy of ESCOs under the uncertainty of the value of Energy Performance Contracting Projects," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 710-721.
    9. Alejandro Caparrós & Michael Finus, 2020. "Public good agreements under the weakest‐link technology," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(3), pages 555-582, June.
    10. Johannes Münster & Markus Reisinger, 2021. "Sequencing Bilateral Negotiations with Externalities," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 096, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    11. Camiña, Ester & Porteiro, Nicolás, 2009. "The role of mediation in peacemaking and peacekeeping negotiations," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 73-92, January.
    12. Ursula F Ott & Pervez N Ghauri, 2019. "Brexit negotiations: From negotiation space to agreement zones," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 50(1), pages 137-149, February.
    13. Joalland, Olivier & Pereau, Jean-Christophe & Rambonilaza, Tina, 2019. "Bargaining local compensation payments for the installation of new power transmission lines," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 75-85.
    14. Ross Hickey, 2013. "Bicameral bargaining and federation formation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 154(3), pages 217-241, March.
    15. Zhang, Meng & Kong, Zhaojun, 2022. "A multi-attribute double auction and bargaining model for emergency material procurement," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 254(C).
    16. Takeuchi, Ai & Veszteg, Róbert F. & Kamijo, Yoshio & Funaki, Yukihiko, 2022. "Bargaining over a jointly produced pie: The effect of the production function on bargaining outcomes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 169-198.
    17. Venkat Venkatasubramanian & Yu Luo, 2018. "How much income inequality is fair? Nash bargaining solution and its connection to entropy," Papers 1806.05262, arXiv.org.
    18. Helmut Rainer & Thomas Siedler, 2009. "O Brother, Where Art Thou? The Effects of Having a Sibling on Geographic Mobility and Labour Market Outcomes," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 76(303), pages 528-556, July.
    19. Ansink, Erik & Weikard, Hans-Peter, 2009. "Contested water rights," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 247-260, June.
    20. Eso, Peter & Wallace, Chris, 2016. "Persuasion and Pricing : Dynamic Trading with Hard Evidence," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series 24, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Dispute resolution; Behavioral economics; Experimental analysis; C91; D03; K41;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:36:y:2013:i:2:p:373-388. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.