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Managing financial expertise

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  • Asano, Koji
Abstract
We study credit markets in which lenders can invest in financial expertise to reduce the cost of acquiring information about underlying collateral. If the pledgeability of corporate income is low, information acquisition increases lending, but lenders reduce expertise acquisition because of the hold-up problem. By contrast, if the pledgeability is high, information acquisition reduces lending so that lenders can extract rents from firms by investing in financial expertise and creating fear of information acquisition. Optimal policy involves subsidizing investment in financial expertise when the pledgeability is low and taxing investment in financial expertise when the pledgeability is high.

Suggested Citation

  • Asano, Koji, 2024. "Managing financial expertise," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 89(PA), pages 351-365.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:reveco:v:89:y:2024:i:pa:p:351-365
    DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2023.07.101
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    Cited by:

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Financial expertise; Collateral; Information acquisition; Liquidity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General

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