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The role of risk preferences in a multi-target defender-attacker resource allocation game

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  • Zhang, Jing
  • Zhuang, Jun
  • Jose, Victor Richmond R.
Abstract
This paper studies a sequential defender-attacker game, where the defender allocates defensive resources to multiple potential targets while considering the risk preferences of both attacker and defender. We model and obtain analytical equilibrium results for this problem and study how risk preferences affect a player’s behavior in equilibrium. We find that in the strategic case, when both the attacker and the defender have some target valuation, the strategic attacker’s risk preferences and target valuation affect the optimal defense allocation. In particular, when the attacker becomes more risk seeking/averse, the high valuable target to the attacker would receive more/less resources. The proposed model leads to a significantly lower expected damage than a model where the attacker is incorrectly considered risk neutral, especially when the attacker is risk seeking.

Suggested Citation

  • Zhang, Jing & Zhuang, Jun & Jose, Victor Richmond R., 2018. "The role of risk preferences in a multi-target defender-attacker resource allocation game," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 95-104.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:reensy:v:169:y:2018:i:c:p:95-104
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ress.2017.08.002
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    9. Hunt, Kyle & Zhuang, Jun, 2024. "A review of attacker-defender games: Current state and paths forward," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 313(2), pages 401-417.
    10. Kjell Hausken, 2020. "Governmental combat of migration between competing terrorist organisations," Operations Research and Decisions, Wroclaw University of Science and Technology, Faculty of Management, vol. 30(3), pages 21-46.
    11. Wang, Shuliang & Sun, Jingya & Zhang, Jianhua & Dong, Qiqi & Gu, Xifeng & Chen, Chen, 2023. "Attack-Defense game analysis of critical infrastructure network based on Cournot model with fixed operating nodes," International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection, Elsevier, vol. 40(C).
    12. Simon, Jay & Omar, Ayman, 2020. "Cybersecurity investments in the supply chain: Coordination and a strategic attacker," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 282(1), pages 161-171.
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    16. Zhang, Xiaoxiong & Ding, Song & Ge, Bingfeng & Xia, Boyuan & Pedrycz, Witold, 2021. "Resource allocation among multiple targets for a defender-attacker game with false targets consideration," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 211(C).
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    18. Chaoqi, Fu & Yangjun, Gao & Jilong, Zhong & Yun, Sun & Pengtao, Zhang & Tao, Wu, 2021. "Attack-defense game for critical infrastructure considering the cascade effect," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 216(C).
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