Health-promoting alliances
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- Eyckmans, Johan & Finus, Michael, 2009. "An Almost Ideal Sharing Scheme for Coalition Games with Externalities," Stirling Economics Discussion Papers 2009-10, University of Stirling, Division of Economics.
- Johan Eyckmans & Michael Finus, 2004. "An Almost Ideal Sharing Scheme for Coalition Games with Externalities," Working Papers 2004.155, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Rich, Karl M. & Winter-Nelson, Alex & Brozovic, Nicholas, 2005. "Regionalization and foot-and-mouth disease control in South America: Lessons from spatial models of coordination and interactions," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 45(2-3), pages 526-540, May.
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