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Optimal fiscal federalism in the presence of tax competition

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  • Janeba, Eckhard
  • Wilson, John Douglas
Abstract
This paper models the optimal division of public goods provision between central and regional governments in an economy with interregional tax competition. Regional provision is inefficient because governments compete for scarce capital by lowering their capital taxes and public good levels to inefficiently low levels. On the other hand, central provision is inefficient because it is determined by the minimum winning coalition within a legislature. The optimal degree to which public good provision should be decentralized depends on a tradeoff between these inefficiencies. In our main model, complete centralization is never optimal: regional governments should supply some public goods.

Suggested Citation

  • Janeba, Eckhard & Wilson, John Douglas, 2011. "Optimal fiscal federalism in the presence of tax competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(11), pages 1302-1311.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:95:y:2011:i:11:p:1302-1311
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.11.029
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Jacek Rothert, 2020. "Optimal federal redistribution during the uncoordinated response to a pandemic," Departmental Working Papers 64, United States Naval Academy Department of Economics.
    2. David R. Agrawal, 2024. "Limits to Competition: Strategies for Promoting Jurisdictional Cooperation," NBER Chapters, in: Policy Responses to Tax Competition, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Aslim, Erkmen Giray & Neyapti, Bilin, 2017. "Optimal fiscal decentralization: Redistribution and welfare implications," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 224-234.
    4. Haufler, Andreas & Lülfesmann, Christoph, 2015. "Reforming an asymmetric union: On the virtues of dual tier capital taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 125(C), pages 116-127.
    5. Francis Bloch & Ünal Zenginobuz, 2015. "Oates’ decentralization theorem with imperfect household mobility," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 22(3), pages 353-375, June.
    6. Jean-Marc Bourgeon & Marie-Laure Breuillé, 2023. "Citizen preferences and the architecture of government," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 61(3), pages 537-585, October.
    7. Francisco J. Delgado, 2021. "On the Determinants of Fiscal Decentralization: Evidence From the EU," The AMFITEATRU ECONOMIC journal, Academy of Economic Studies - Bucharest, Romania, vol. 23(56), pages 206-206, February.
    8. Jacek Rothert, 2021. "Optimal federal transfers during uncoordinated response to a pandemic," GRAPE Working Papers 58, GRAPE Group for Research in Applied Economics.
    9. Rothert, Jacek, 2021. "Strategic inefficiencies and federal redistribution during uncoordinated response to pandemic waves," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    10. Johannes Becker & Michael Kriebel, 2017. "Fiscal equalisation schemes under competition," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 24(5), pages 800-816, September.
    11. Jacek Rothert, 2022. "Optimal federal transfers during uncoordinated response to a pandemic," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 24(5), pages 1124-1153, October.
    12. Janeba, Eckhard & Todtenhaupt, Maximilian, 2018. "Fiscal competition and public debt," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 47-61.
    13. Bellofatto, Antonio Andrés & Besfamille, Martín, 2021. "Tax decentralization notwithstanding regional disparities," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 123(C).
    14. Emilson Caputo Delfino Silva, 2017. "Tax competition and federal equalization schemes with decentralized leadership," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 24(1), pages 164-178, February.
    15. Simon, Andrew & Wilson, Matthew, 2021. "Optimal minimum wage setting in a federal system," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 123(C).
    16. Christofzik, Désirée I. & Feld, Lars P. & Yeter, Mustafa, 2020. "Heterogeneous price and quantity effects of the real estate transfer tax in Germany," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 20/10, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
    17. Osiris Jorge Parcero, 2024. "Optimal National policies towards multinationals when local regions can choose between firm-specific and non-firm-specific policies," Papers 2401.04243, arXiv.org.
    18. Oliver Lorz & Gerald Willmann, 2013. "Size versus scope: on the trade-off facing economic unions," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 20(2), pages 247-267, April.
    19. Bellofatto, Antonio Andrés & Besfamille, Martín, 2018. "Regional state capacity and the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 159(C), pages 225-243.
    20. Hui Jin & Mihajlo Jakovljevic, 2023. "Fiscal Decentralization and the Human Development Index: A Cross-Border Empirical Study," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(11), pages 1-16, May.

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