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Politics and public goods in developing countries: Evidence from the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi

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  • Blakeslee, David S.
Abstract
This paper employs an instrumental variables strategy to identify the effect of party ideology on policy outcomes. Exogenous variation in party representation is generated by the assassination of the leader of the Congress party, which occurred midway through India's national elections in 1991, and dramatically increased the probability of Congress victory for a subset of constituencies. Representation by the Congress party leads to a substantial increase in the provision of public goods favored by the poor, consistent with the party's expressed populist agenda. Among the salient changes are increases in the availability of drinking water and primary education, and declines in agricultural and industrial electrification and telephone coverage. I compare these effects to those obtained using a regression discontinuity design, and find that the latter yields little effect of Congress representation on public goods allocations.

Suggested Citation

  • Blakeslee, David S., 2018. "Politics and public goods in developing countries: Evidence from the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 1-19.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:163:y:2018:i:c:p:1-19
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.12.011
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Sitakanta Panda, 2015. "Political Connections and Elite Capture in a Poverty Alleviation Programme in India," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 51(1), pages 50-65, January.
    2. Parra, Daniel & Muñoz-Herrera, Manuel & Palacio, Luis A., 2021. "The limits of transparency in reducing corruption," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 95(C).
    3. Daniel Parra & Manuel Munoz-Herrera & Luis Palacio, 2019. "The limits of transparency as a means of reducing corruption," Working Papers 20190026, New York University Abu Dhabi, Department of Social Science, revised May 2019.
    4. Chitra Jogani, 2022. "Effect of Political Quotas on Attributes of Political Candidates and Provision of Public Goods," Eastern Economic Journal, Palgrave Macmillan;Eastern Economic Association, vol. 48(2), pages 267-316, April.
    5. Bharatee Bhusana Dash & J. Stephen Ferris, 2018. "Economic Performance and Electoral Volatility: Testing the Economic Voting Hypothesis on Indian States, 1957–2013," Carleton Economic Papers 18-07, Carleton University, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Political economy; Public goods; India;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • O10 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General

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