Implementation of mechanism by processes : Public good allocation experiments
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- Julian Rauchdobler & Rupert Sausgruber & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2010.
"Voting on Thresholds for Public Goods: Experimental Evidence,"
FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 66(1), pages 34-64, March.
- Julian Rauchdobler & Rupert Sausgruber & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2009. "Voting on Thresholds for Public Goods: Experimental Evidence," CESifo Working Paper Series 2896, CESifo.
- Julian Rauchdobler & Rupert Sausgruber & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2009. "Voting on Thresholds for Public Goods: Experimental Evidence," Discussion Papers 09-27, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Philippe Aghion & Ernst Fehr & Richard Holden & Tom Wilkening, 2018.
"The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation—An Empirical Investigation,"
Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 232-274.
- Philippe Aghion & Ernst Fehr & Richard Holden & Tom Wilkening, 2015. "The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation - An Empirical Investigation," CESifo Working Paper Series 5300, CESifo.
- Philippe Aghion & Ernst Fehr & Richard Holden & Tom Wilkening, 2018. "The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation—An Empirical Investigation," Post-Print halshs-01756795, HAL.
- Aghion, Philippe & Fehr, Ernst & Holden, Richard & Wilkening, Tom, 2015. "The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation: An Empirical Investigation," IZA Discussion Papers 8971, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Philippe Aghion & Ernst Fehr & Richard Holden & Tom Wilkening, 2018. "The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation—An Empirical Investigation," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01756795, HAL.
- Philippe Aghion & Ernst Fehr & Richard Holden & Tom Wilkening, 2015. "The role of bounded rationality and imperfect information in subgame perfect implementation: an empirical investigation," ECON - Working Papers 189, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
- Ledyard, John O., "undated".
"Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research,"
Working Papers
861, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- J. Ledyard, 1997. "Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research," Levine's Working Paper Archive 509, David K. Levine.
- John O. Ledyard, 1994. "Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research," Public Economics 9405003, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 22 May 1994.
- Ernst Fehr & Michael Powell & Tom Wilkening, 2014.
"Handing Out Guns at a Knife Fight: Behavioral Limitations of Subgame-Perfect Implementation,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
4948, CESifo.
- Fehr, Ernst & Powell, Michael & Wilkening, Tom, 2014. "Handing Out Guns at a Knife Fight: Behavioral Limitations of Subgame-Perfect Implementation," IZA Discussion Papers 8404, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Ernst Fehr & Michael Powell & Tom Wilkening, 2021.
"Behavioral Constraints on the Design of Subgame-Perfect Implementation Mechanisms,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(4), pages 1055-1091, April.
- Fehr, Ernst & Powell, Michael & Wilkening, Tom, 2021. "Behavioral Constraints on the Design of Subgame-Perfect Implementation Mechanisms," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 111(4), pages 1055-1091.
- Ernst Fehr & Michael Powell & Tom Wilkening, 2014. "Behavioral constraints on the design of subgame-perfect implementation mechanisms," ECON - Working Papers 171, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Nov 2020.
- Bracht, Juergen & Figuieres, Charles & Ratto, Marisa, 2008.
"Relative performance of two simple incentive mechanisms in a public goods experiment,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(1-2), pages 54-90, February.
- Juergen Bracht & Charles Figuieres & Marisa Ratto, 2004. "Relative performance of two simple incentive mechanisms in a public good experiment," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 04/102, The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol, UK.
- Juergen Bracht & Charles Figuières & Marisa Ratto, 2004. "Relative performance of two simple incentive mechanisms in a public good experiment," IDEP Working Papers 0409, Institut d'economie publique (IDEP), Marseille, France.
- Juergen Bracht & Charles C. Figuieres & Marisa Ratto, 2008. "Relative performance of two simple incentive mechanisms in a public goods experiment [Performance relative de deux méchanismes incitatifs simple : expérimentation pour un bien public]," Post-Print hal-02658682, HAL.
- Chen, Yan & Plott, Charles R., 1996.
"The Groves-Ledyard mechanism: An experimental study of institutional design,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(3), pages 335-364, March.
- Chen, Yan & Plott, Charles R., "undated". "The Groves-Ledyard Mechanism: An Experimental Study of Institutional Design," Working Papers 867, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Josef Falkinger, 2000.
"A Simple Mechanism for the Efficient Provision of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 247-264, March.
- Josef Falkinger & Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, "undated". "A Simple Mechanism for the Efficient Provision of Public Goods - Experimental Evidence," IEW - Working Papers 003, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Yi-Chun Chen & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Yifei Sun & Tom Wilkening, 2023. "Getting Dynamic Implementation to Work," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 131(2), pages 285-387.
- repec:dau:papers:123456789/4809 is not listed on IDEAS
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