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Technology and torts: Memory costs, nondurable precautions and interference effects

Author

Listed:
  • De Mot, Jef
  • Depoorter, Ben
Abstract
This article examines the influence of nondurable precaution technologies on the expansion of tort awards. We provide four contributions to the literature. First, we present a general, formal model on durable and non-durable precaution technology that focuses on memory costs. Second, because liability exposure creates interference, we argue that tort law perpetuates the expansion of awards. Third, because plaintiffs do not consider the social costs of interference effects, private litigation induces socially excessive suits. Fourth, while new harm-reducing technologies likely increase accident rates, such technologies also raise the ratio of trial costs to harm, leaving undetermined the overall effect of new technologies on the rate of litigation.

Suggested Citation

  • De Mot, Jef & Depoorter, Ben, 2011. "Technology and torts: Memory costs, nondurable precautions and interference effects," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 284-290.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:31:y:2011:i:4:p:284-290
    DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2011.07.005
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
    2. Nussim, Jacob & Tabbach, Avraham D., 2009. "A revised model of unilateral accidents," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 169-177, June.
    3. Astebro, Thomas B. & Dahlin, Kristina B., 2005. "Opportunity knocks," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 34(9), pages 1404-1418, November.
    4. Giuseppe Dari Mattiacci & Francesco Parisi, 2005. "The Economics of Tort Law," Chapters, in: Jürgen G. Backhaus (ed.), The Elgar Companion to Law and Economics, Second Edition, chapter 6, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    5. Schmookler, Jacob, 1962. "Economic Sources of Inventive Activity," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 22(1), pages 1-20, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Miriam C. Buiten, 2024. "Product liability for defective AI," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 57(1), pages 239-273, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Tort law; Tort award; Nondurable precautions; Technology;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • F02 - International Economics - - General - - - International Economic Order and Integration
    • K34 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Tax Law

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