[go: up one dir, main page]
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/irlaec/v20y2000i2p285-294.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Pretrial negotiation behind open doors versus closed doors:: Economic analysis of Rule 408

Author

Listed:
  • Kima, Jeong-Yoo
  • Ryu, Keunkwan
Abstract
No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Kima, Jeong-Yoo & Ryu, Keunkwan, 2000. "Pretrial negotiation behind open doors versus closed doors:: Economic analysis of Rule 408," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 285-294, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:20:y:2000:i:2:p:285-294
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0144-8188(00)00026-0
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kathryn E. Spier, 1994. "Pretrial Bargaining and the Design of Fee-Shifting Rules," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(2), pages 197-214, Summer.
    2. Daughety, Adnrew F & Reinganum, Jennifer F, 1993. "Endogenous Sequencing in Models of Settlement and Litigation," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(2), pages 314-348, October.
    3. Wang, Gyu Ho & Kim, Jeong-Yoo & Yi, Jong-Goo, 1994. "Litigation and Pretrial Negotiation under Incomplete Information," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(1), pages 187-200, April.
    4. Urs Schweizer, 1989. "Litigation and Settlement under Two-Sided Incomplete Information," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 56(2), pages 163-177.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Koçkesen, Levent & Usman, Murat, 2012. "Litigation and settlement under judicial agency," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 300-308.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Schwab, Christian & Tang, Hin-Yue Benny, 2011. "Die Steuerungswirkungen unterschiedlicher Prozesskostenregelungen: Ein Überblick zum Stand von Theorie und Empirie [The economic effects of alternative fee shifting rules: A review of the theoretic," MPRA Paper 32746, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Chopard, Bertrand & Cortade, Thomas & Langlais, Eric, 2010. "Trial and settlement negotiations between asymmetrically skilled parties," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 18-27, March.
    3. Argenton, Cedric & Wang, Xiaoyu, 2020. "Litigation and Settlement under Loss Aversion," Other publications TiSEM b6c48abc-9b47-4c3b-848b-3, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    4. Bester, Helmut & Konrad, Kai A., 2004. "Delay in contests," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(5), pages 1169-1178, October.
    5. Daughety, Andrew F. & Reinganum, Jennifer F., 1994. "Settlement negotiations with two-sided asymmetric information: Model duality, information distribution, and efficiency," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 283-298, September.
    6. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 1995. "Keeping Society in the Dark: On the Admissibility of Pretrial Negotiations as Evidence in Court," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(2), pages 203-221, Summer.
    7. Axel Gautier & Nicolas Petit, 2018. "Optimal enforcement of competition policy: the commitments procedure under uncertainty," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 45(2), pages 195-224, April.
    8. Michael R. Baye & Dan Kovenock & Casper G. Vries, 2005. "Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: An Auction-Theoretic Approach," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 115(505), pages 583-601, July.
    9. Anne Duchêne, 2017. "Patent Litigation Insurance," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 84(2), pages 631-660, June.
    10. Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe & Saraceno, Margherita, 2020. "Fee shifting and accuracy in adjudication," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    11. Lee, Yoon-Ho Alex & Klerman, Daniel, 2016. "The Priest-Klein hypotheses: Proofs and generality," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 59-76.
    12. Andrew F. Daughety & Reinganum F. Reinganum, 2014. "Settlement and Trial: Selected Analyses of the Bargaining Environment," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 14-00005, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
    13. Cédric Argenton & Xiaoyu Wang, 2023. "Litigation and settlement under loss aversion," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 56(2), pages 369-402, October.
    14. Wladislaw Mill & Jonathan Staebler, 2023. "Spite in Litigation," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2023_401, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    15. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:11:y:2007:i:1:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Christopher C. Klein, 2007. "Anticompetitive Litigation and Antitrust Liability," Working Papers 200713, Middle Tennessee State University, Department of Economics and Finance.
    17. Sanchez-Pages, Santiago, 2009. "Bargaining and Conflict with Incomplete Information," SIRE Discussion Papers 2009-55, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
    18. Kirstein Annette & Kirstein Roland & Gerhard Hans, 2010. "Bad Debt Loss Insurance in Settlement and Litigation," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 6(1), pages 107-124, May.
    19. Steven Shavell, 2003. "Economic Analysis of Litigation and the Legal Process," NBER Working Papers 9697, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. Miceli, Thomas J., 1999. "Settlement delay as a sorting device," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 265-274, June.
    21. Motta, Massimo & Polo, Michele, 2003. "Leniency programs and cartel prosecution," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 347-379, March.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:20:y:2000:i:2:p:285-294. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/irle .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.