A note on Kuhn’s Theorem with ambiguity averse players
Author
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.08.018
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.
Other versions of this item:
- Aryal, Gaurab & Stauber, Ronald, 2014. "A Note on Kuhn’s Theorem with Ambiguity Averse Players," MPRA Paper 57336, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Gaurab Aryal & Ronald Stauber, 2014. "A Note on Kuhn's Theorem with Ambiguity Averse Players," Papers 1408.1022, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2014.
References listed on IDEAS
- Lo, Kin Chung, 1996.
"Equilibrium in Beliefs under Uncertainty,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 443-484, November.
- Kin Chung Lo, 1995. "Equilibrium in Beliefs Under Uncertainty," Working Papers ecpap-95-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Sass, Linda, 2014. "Kuhn's Theorem for Extensive Form Ellsberg Games," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 478, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
- Aryal, Gaurab & Stauber, Ronald, 2014.
"A note on Kuhn’s Theorem with ambiguity averse players,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(1), pages 110-114.
- Gaurab Aryal & Ronald Stauber, 2014. "A Note on Kuhn's Theorem with Ambiguity Averse Players," Papers 1408.1022, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2014.
- Aryal, Gaurab & Stauber, Ronald, 2014. "A Note on Kuhn’s Theorem with Ambiguity Averse Players," MPRA Paper 57336, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- R. H. Strotz, 1955. "Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 23(3), pages 165-180.
- Frank Riedel & Linda Sass, 2014.
"Ellsberg games,"
Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 76(4), pages 469-509, April.
- Riedel, Frank & Sass, Linda, 2013. "Ellsberg Games," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 80012, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Epstein, Larry G. & Schneider, Martin, 2003.
"Recursive multiple-priors,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 113(1), pages 1-31, November.
- Larry G. Epstein & Martin Schneider, 2001. "Recursive Multiple-Priors," RCER Working Papers 485, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Gaurab Aryal & Ronald Stauber, 2014.
"Trembles in extensive games with ambiguity averse players,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 57(1), pages 1-40, September.
- Gaurab Aryal & Ronald Stauber, 2013. "Trembles in Extensive Games with Ambiguity Averse Players," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2013-606, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
- Gilboa, Itzhak & Schmeidler, David, 1989.
"Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 141-153, April.
- Gilboa, Itzhak & Schmeidler, David, 1986. "Maxmin Expected Utility with a Non-Unique Prior," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 275405, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.
- Itzhak Gilboa & David Schmeidler, 1989. "Maxmin Expected Utility with Non-Unique Prior," Post-Print hal-00753237, HAL.
- Atsushi Kajii & Takashi Ui, 2005.
"Incomplete Information Games With Multiple Priors,"
The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 56(3), pages 332-351, September.
- Atsushi Kajii & Takashi Ui, 2004. "Incomplete Information Games with Multiple Priors," KIER Working Papers 583, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
- Maschler,Michael & Solan,Eilon & Zamir,Shmuel, 2013. "Game Theory," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107005488.
- Epstein Larry G. & Le Breton Michel, 1993. "Dynamically Consistent Beliefs Must Be Bayesian," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 1-22, October.
- Muraviev, Igor & Riedel, Frank & Sass, Linda, 2017.
"Kuhn’s Theorem for extensive form Ellsberg games,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 26-41.
- Mouraviev, Igor & Riedel, Frank & Sass, Linda, 2016. "Kuhn's Theorem for Extensive Form Ellsberg Games," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 510, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Gaurab Aryal & Dong-Hyuk Kim, 2013.
"Emprical Relevance of Ambiguity in First Price Auction Models,"
ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics
2013-607, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
- Gaurab Aryal & Dong-Hyuk Kim, 2015. "Empirical Relevance of Ambiguity in First Price Auction Models," Papers 1504.02516, arXiv.org.
- Aryal, Gaurab & Stauber, Ronald, 2014.
"A note on Kuhn’s Theorem with ambiguity averse players,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(1), pages 110-114.
- Gaurab Aryal & Ronald Stauber, 2014. "A Note on Kuhn's Theorem with Ambiguity Averse Players," Papers 1408.1022, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2014.
- Aryal, Gaurab & Stauber, Ronald, 2014. "A Note on Kuhn’s Theorem with Ambiguity Averse Players," MPRA Paper 57336, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Frank Riedel, 2017.
"Uncertain Acts in Games,"
Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 34(4), pages 275-292, December.
- Riedel, Frank, 2017. "Uncertain acts in games," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 571, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
- Gerrit Bauch & Frank Riedel, 2022. "The Texas Shootout under Uncertainty," Papers 2211.10089, arXiv.org.
- Pahlke, Marieke, 2022.
"Dynamic consistency in incomplete information games with multiple priors,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 85-108.
- Pahlke, Marieke, 2018. "Dynamic Consistency in Incomplete Information Games with Multiple Priors," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 599, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
- Gerrit Bauch, 2023. "Underreaction and dynamic inconsistency in communication games under noise," Papers 2311.12496, arXiv.org.
- Gaurab Aryal & Ronald Stauber, 2014.
"Trembles in extensive games with ambiguity averse players,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 57(1), pages 1-40, September.
- Gaurab Aryal & Ronald Stauber, 2013. "Trembles in Extensive Games with Ambiguity Averse Players," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2013-606, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
- Stauber, Ronald, 2017. "Irrationality and ambiguity in extensive games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 409-432.
- Muraviev, Igor & Riedel, Frank & Sass, Linda, 2017.
"Kuhn’s Theorem for extensive form Ellsberg games,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 26-41.
- Mouraviev, Igor & Riedel, Frank & Sass, Linda, 2016. "Kuhn's Theorem for Extensive Form Ellsberg Games," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 510, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Stauber, Ronald, 2017. "Irrationality and ambiguity in extensive games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 409-432.
- Muraviev, Igor & Riedel, Frank & Sass, Linda, 2017.
"Kuhn’s Theorem for extensive form Ellsberg games,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 26-41.
- Mouraviev, Igor & Riedel, Frank & Sass, Linda, 2016. "Kuhn's Theorem for Extensive Form Ellsberg Games," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 510, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
- Frank Riedel, 2017.
"Uncertain Acts in Games,"
Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 34(4), pages 275-292, December.
- Riedel, Frank, 2017. "Uncertain acts in games," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 571, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
- Gaurab Aryal & Ronald Stauber, 2014.
"Trembles in extensive games with ambiguity averse players,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 57(1), pages 1-40, September.
- Gaurab Aryal & Ronald Stauber, 2013. "Trembles in Extensive Games with Ambiguity Averse Players," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2013-606, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
- Dorian Beauchêne, 2016. "Solution concepts for games with ambiguous payoffs," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 80(2), pages 245-269, February.
- Pahlke, Marieke, 2022.
"Dynamic consistency in incomplete information games with multiple priors,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 85-108.
- Pahlke, Marieke, 2018. "Dynamic Consistency in Incomplete Information Games with Multiple Priors," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 599, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
- Grant, Simon & Meneghel, Idione & Tourky, Rabee, 2016. "Savage games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(2), May.
- Galanis, S. & Ioannou, C. & Kotronis, S., 2019.
"Information Aggregation Under Ambiguity: Theory and Experimental Evidence,"
Working Papers
20/05, Department of Economics, City University London.
- Spyros Galanis & Christos A. Ioannou & Stelios Kotronis, 2023. "Information Aggregation Under Ambiguity: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Department of Economics Working Papers 2023_04, Durham University, Department of Economics.
- Ellis, Andrew, 2018.
"On dynamic consistency in ambiguous games,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 241-249.
- Ellis, Andrew, 2018. "On dynamic consistency in ambiguous games," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 89387, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Takao Asano, 2004. "Portfolio Inertia and [Epsilon]-Contaminations," ISER Discussion Paper 0610, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Riedel, Frank & Tallon, Jean-Marc & Vergopoulos, Vassili, 2018.
"Dynamically consistent preferences under imprecise probabilistic information,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 117-124.
- Frank Riedel & Jean-Marc Tallon & Vassili Vergopoulos, 2017. "Dynamically Consistent Preferences Under Imprecise Probabilistic Information," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01513820, HAL.
- Frank Riedel & Jean-Marc Tallon & Vassili Vergopoulos, 2018. "Dynamically consistent preferences under imprecise probabilistic information," Post-Print halshs-01886573, HAL.
- Frank Riedel & Jean-Marc Tallon & Vassili Vergopoulos, 2017. "Dynamically Consistent Preferences Under Imprecise Probabilistic Information," Working Papers halshs-01513820, HAL.
- Frank Riedel & Jean-Marc Tallon & Vassili Vergopoulos, 2018. "Dynamically consistent preferences under imprecise probabilistic information," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01886573, HAL.
- Frank Riedel & Jean-Marc Tallon & Vassili Vergopoulos, 2018. "Dynamically consistent preferences under imprecise probabilistic information," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01886573, HAL.
- Frank Riedel & Jean-Marc Tallon & Vassili Vergopoulos, 2017. "Dynamically Consistent Preferences Under Imprecise Probabilistic Information," PSE Working Papers halshs-01513820, HAL.
- Riedel, Frank & Tallon, Jean-Marc & Vergopoulos, Vassili, 2017. "Dynamically consistent preferences under imprecise probabilistic information," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 573, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
- Zimper, Alexander, 2009.
"Half empty, half full and why we can agree to disagree forever,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 283-299, August.
- Alexander Zimper, 2007. "Half empty, half full and why we can agree to disagree forever," Working Papers 058, Economic Research Southern Africa.
- Klibanoff, Peter & Marinacci, Massimo & Mukerji, Sujoy, 2009.
"Recursive smooth ambiguity preferences,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 930-976, May.
- Peter Klibanoff & Massimo Marinacci & Sujoy Mukerji, 2006. "Recursive Smooth Ambiguity Preferences," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 17, Collegio Carlo Alberto, revised 2008.
- Azrieli, Yaron & Teper, Roee, 2011.
"Uncertainty aversion and equilibrium existence in games with incomplete information,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 310-317.
- Azrieli, Yaron & Teper, Roee, 2009. "Uncertainty aversion and equilibrium existence in games with incomplete information," MPRA Paper 17617, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Hill, Brian, 2020. "Dynamic consistency and ambiguity: A reappraisal," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 289-310.
- Ronald Stauber, 2019. "A strategic product for belief functions," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2019-668, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
- Stauber, Ronald, 2019. "A strategic product for belief functions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 38-64.
- Luo, Xiao & Ma, Chenghu, 2003. ""Agreeing to disagree" type results: a decision-theoretic approach," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(8), pages 849-861, November.
- Bade, Sophie, 2022. "Dynamic semi-consistency," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 117-126.
- Dominiak, Adam & Tserenjigmid, Gerelt, 2022. "Ambiguity under growing awareness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 199(C).
More about this item
Keywords
Extensive games; Ambiguity; Maxmin; Dynamic consistency;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:125:y:2014:i:1:p:110-114. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.