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American Idol: should it be a singing contest or a popularity contest?

Author

Listed:
  • J. Atsu Amegashie

    (University of Guelph)

Abstract
In the popular FOX TV reality show, American Idol, the judges, who are presumably experts in evaluating singing effort, have no voting power when the field is narrowed to the top twenty-four contestants. It is only the votes of viewers that count. In the 2007 season of the show, one of the judges, Simon Cowell, threatened to quit the show if a contestant, Sanjaya Malakar, who was clearly a low-ability contestant, won the competition. He was concerned that the show was becoming a popularity contest instead of a singing contest. Is this a problem? Not necessarily. I show that, under certain conditions, making success in the contest dependent on a contestant's popularity and not solely on her singing ability or performance, could paradoxically increase aggregate singing effort. It may be optimal to give the entire voting power to the viewers whose evaluation of singing effort is noisier.

Suggested Citation

  • J. Atsu Amegashie, 2007. "American Idol: should it be a singing contest or a popularity contest?," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 28(16), pages 1.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-07aa0030
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    Cited by:

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    2. Budzinski, Oliver & Gänßle, Sophia & Lindstädt-Dreusicke, Nadine, 2021. "Wettbewerb und Antitrust in Unterhaltungsmärkten," Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 147, Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics.
    3. Brinja Meiseberg, 2014. "Trust the artist versus trust the tale: performance implications of talent and self-marketing in folk music," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 38(1), pages 9-42, February.
    4. Kräkel, Matthias, 2008. "Optimal risk taking in an uneven tournament game with risk averse players," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(11), pages 1219-1231, December.
    5. Gaenssle, Sophia & Budzinski, Oliver, 2019. "Stars in social media: New light through old windows?," Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 123, Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics.
    6. Amegashie, J. Atsu, 2012. "A nested contest: Tullock meets the All-Pay Auction," MPRA Paper 41654, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 03 Sep 2012.
    7. Qiang Fu & Qian Jiao & Jingfeng Lu, 2015. "Contests with endogenous entry," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(2), pages 387-424, May.
    8. Asmat, Roberto & Borowiecki, Karol J. & Law, Marc T., 2023. "Do experts and laypersons differ? Some evidence from international classical music competitions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 214(C), pages 270-290.
    9. Qiang Fu & Jingfeng Lu & Jun Zhang, 2016. "Disclosure policy in Tullock contests with asymmetric stochastic entry," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 49(1), pages 52-75, February.
    10. Samuel Cameron, 2016. "Past, present and future: music economics at the crossroads," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 40(1), pages 1-12, February.
    11. Kräkel, Matthias & Nieken, Petra & Przemeck, Judith, 2014. "Risk taking and investing in electoral competition," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 98-120.
    12. Nieken, Petra & Stegh, Michael, 2010. "Incentive Effects in Asymmetric Tournaments Empirical Evidence from the German Hockey League," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 305, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    13. Budzinski, Oliver & Kohlschreiber, Marie & Kuchinke, Björn & Pannicke, Julia, 2019. "Does music quality matter for audience voters in a music contest?," Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 122, Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics.
    14. Robson, Karen & Plangger, Kirk & Kietzmann, Jan H. & McCarthy, Ian & Pitt, Leyland, 2015. "Is it all a game? Understanding the principles of gamification," Business Horizons, Elsevier, vol. 58(4), pages 411-420.
    15. Daegon Cho & Seok Ho Lee & Yeawon Yoo & Hyo-Youn Chu, 2019. "Television singing competitions create stars? Empirical evidence from the digital music chart in South Korea," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 43(1), pages 1-20, March.

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    JEL classification:

    • D0 - Microeconomics - - General
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

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