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Monotone Preferences over Information

Author

Listed:
  • Dubra Juan

    (Universidad de Montevideo, dubraj@um.edu.uy)

  • Echenique Federico

    (Universidad Torcuato Di Tella and Universidad de la Republica, fede@hss.caltech.edu)

Abstract
We consider preference relations over information that are monotone: more information is preferred to less. We prove that, if a preference relation on information about an uncountable set of states of nature is monotone, then it is not representable by a utility function.

Suggested Citation

  • Dubra Juan & Echenique Federico, 2001. "Monotone Preferences over Information," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 1-18, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:topics.1:y:2001:i:1:n:1
    DOI: 10.2202/1534-598X.1033
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Aumann, Robert J., 1974. "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 67-96, March.
    2. Athey, Susan & Levin, Jonathan, 2018. "The value of information in monotone decision problems," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 101-116.
    3. Beardon, Alan F. & Candeal, Juan C. & Herden, Gerhard & Indurain, Esteban & Mehta, Ghanshyam B., 2002. "The non-existence of a utility function and the structure of non-representable preference relations," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 17-38, February.
    4. Juan Dubra & Efe A. Ok, 2002. "A Model of Procedural Decision Making in the Presence of Risk," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 43(4), pages 1053-1080, November.
    5. Nicola Persico, 1996. "Information Acquisition in Affiliated Decision Problems," Discussion Papers 1149, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    6. Gould, John P., 1974. "Risk, stochastic preference, and the value of information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 64-84, May.
    7. Gilboa, Itzhak & Schmeidler, David, 1989. "Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 141-153, April.
    8. Allen, Beth, 1983. "Neighboring information and distributions of agents' characteristics under uncertainty," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 63-101, September.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. J. Alcantud & G. Bosi & M. Campión & J. Candeal & E. Induráin & C. Rodríguez-Palmero, 2008. "Continuous Utility Functions Through Scales," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 64(4), pages 479-494, June.
    2. Hiroki Nishimura & Efe A. Ok, 2023. "Best Complete Approximations of Preference Relations," Papers 2311.06641, arXiv.org.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    value of information; Blackwell’s Theorem; representation theorems; monotone preferences;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General

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