This article builds on research in psychology, economics, and other fields, suggesting that, under certain conditions, extrinsic incentives could undermine intrinsic motivation, producing results opposite to those originally intended. It explores the relevance of these findings for population policies and particularly for pronatalist measures, and argues that reproductive behavior is intrinsically motivated, thus potentially subject to having the intrinsic motivation for childbearing adversely affected by policy interventions. Specifically, it examines whether, when, and how the contingency, universe, adequacy, and other aspects of pronatalist incentives could affect childbearing motivation. For example, parity-targeted incentives seeking to compel higher fertility could be perceived as controlling and undermine that motivation. Conversely, policies seeking to facilitate combining work and family responsibilities could strengthen the intrinsic motivation for childbearing."> This article builds on research in psychology, economics, and other fields, suggesting that, under certain conditions, extrinsic incentives could undermine intrinsic motivation, producing results opposite to those originally intended. It explores the relevance of these findings for population policies and particularly for pronatalist measures, and argues that reproductive behavior is intrinsically motivated, thus potentially subject to having the intrinsic motivation for childbearing adversely affected by policy interventions. Specifically, it examines whether, when, and how the contingency, universe, adequacy, and other aspects of pronatalist incentives could affect childbearing motivation. For example, parity-targeted incentives seeking to compel higher fertility could be perceived as controlling and undermine that motivation. Conversely, policies seeking to facilitate combining work and family responsibilities could strengthen the intrinsic motivation for childbearing."> This article builds on research in psychology, economics, and other fields, suggesting that, under certain conditions, extrinsic incentives could undermine intrinsic motivation">
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Could Pronatalist Policies Discourage Childbearing?

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  • Nikolai Botev
Abstract
type="main"> This article builds on research in psychology, economics, and other fields, suggesting that, under certain conditions, extrinsic incentives could undermine intrinsic motivation, producing results opposite to those originally intended. It explores the relevance of these findings for population policies and particularly for pronatalist measures, and argues that reproductive behavior is intrinsically motivated, thus potentially subject to having the intrinsic motivation for childbearing adversely affected by policy interventions. Specifically, it examines whether, when, and how the contingency, universe, adequacy, and other aspects of pronatalist incentives could affect childbearing motivation. For example, parity-targeted incentives seeking to compel higher fertility could be perceived as controlling and undermine that motivation. Conversely, policies seeking to facilitate combining work and family responsibilities could strengthen the intrinsic motivation for childbearing.

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  • Nikolai Botev, 2015. "Could Pronatalist Policies Discourage Childbearing?," Population and Development Review, The Population Council, Inc., vol. 41(2), pages 301-314, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:popdev:v:41:y:2015:i:2:p:301-314
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    1. Vytenis Juozas Deimantas & A. Ebru Şanlıtürk & Leo Azzollini & Selin Köksal, 2024. "Population Dynamics and Policies in Europe: Analysis of Population Resilience at the Subnational and National Levels," Population Research and Policy Review, Springer;Southern Demographic Association (SDA), vol. 43(2), pages 1-28, April.
    2. Janna Bergsvik & Agnes Fauske & Rannveig Kaldager Hart, 2021. "Can Policies Stall the Fertility Fall? A Systematic Review of the (Quasi‐) Experimental Literature," Population and Development Review, The Population Council, Inc., vol. 47(4), pages 913-964, December.
    3. LUPPI, FRANCESCA & Rosina, Alessandro & Testa, Maria Rita, 2024. "An Overview on Low Fertility Motivations among Italian Young-Adults," SocArXiv hf78t, Center for Open Science.
    4. Jolene Tan, 2023. "Perceptions towards pronatalist policies in Singapore," Journal of Population Research, Springer, vol. 40(3), pages 1-27, September.
    5. Jolene Tan, 2024. "Beyond fertility figures: towards reproductive rights and choices," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 11(1), pages 1-6, December.
    6. Busygin V.P. & Kulakov D.A., 2016. "Comparative efficiency of child benefits in different European countries," World of economics and management / Vestnik NSU. Series: Social and Economics Sciences, Socionet, vol. 16(3), pages 42-56.

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