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Introduction to the Special Issue on Leadership, Altruism, and Social Organization

Author

Listed:
  • PARKASH CHANDER
  • JOHN P. CONLEY
  • LISE VESTERLUND
Abstract
The objective of the conference on “Leadership, Altruism, and Social Organization” was to bring researchers together who were interested in exploring the functioning of the nonprofit sector. The conference and this special issue focus on three themes. First, what causes social and volunteer‐based organizations to successfully compete against a private enterprise? Second, why do individuals or organizations take the lead in providing or securing provision of public goods? Third, what are the consequences of having altruistically motivated agents, and how can such motives be sustained?

Suggested Citation

  • Parkash Chander & John P. Conley & Lise Vesterlund, 2010. "Introduction to the Special Issue on Leadership, Altruism, and Social Organization," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 12(4), pages 603-608, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:12:y:2010:i:4:p:603-608
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2010.01466.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Varian, Hal R., 1994. "Sequential contributions to public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 165-186, February.
    2. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, April.
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