[go: up one dir, main page]
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/jindec/v49y2001i3p299-318.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Vertical Foreclosure in Broadband Access?

Author

Listed:
  • Daniel L. Rubinfeld
  • Hal J. Singer
Abstract
The merger of AOL and Time Warner involved a vertical combination of the largest Internet content provider and aggregator and a large cable system operator which offers a conduit through which broadband customers can access Internet content at high speeds. We consider the economic incentives of such a firm to engage in two distinct vertical foreclosure strategies: (1) conduit discrimination—insulating its own conduit from competition by limiting rival platform distribution of its affiliated content and services, and (2) content discrimination—insulating its own affiliated content from competition by blocking or degrading the quality of outside content.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Hal J. Singer, 2001. "Vertical Foreclosure in Broadband Access?," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(3), pages 299-318, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jindec:v:49:y:2001:i:3:p:299-318
    DOI: 10.1111/1467-6451.00151
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6451.00151
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/1467-6451.00151?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Zava Aydemir & Stefan Buehler, 2002. "Estimating Vertical Foreclosure in U.S. Gasoline Supply," SOI - Working Papers 0212, Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich.
    2. Christiaan Hogendorn, 2007. "Broadband Internet: net neutrality versus open access," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 185-208, August.
    3. Robert Hahn & Robert Litan & Hal Singer, 2010. "Addressing the next wave of Internet regulation: Toward a workable principle for nondiscrimination," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 4(3), pages 365-382, September.
    4. Foros, Oystein & Jarle Kind, Hans & Yngve Sand, Jan, 2005. "Do internet incumbents choose low interconnection quality?," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 149-164, March.
    5. Daeho Lee & Junseok Hwang, 2011. "The Effect of Network Neutrality on the Incentive to Discriminate, Invest and Innovate: A Literature Review," TEMEP Discussion Papers 201184, Seoul National University; Technology Management, Economics, and Policy Program (TEMEP), revised Nov 2011.
    6. Gregory L. Rosston, 2006. "The Rise and Fall of Third-party High-speed Access," Discussion Papers 05-019, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
    7. Rosston, Gregory L., 2009. "The rise and fall of third-party high-speed access," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 21-33, February.
    8. Paul J.J Welfens, 2010. "Toward a New Concept of Universal Services: The Role of Digital Mobile Services and Network Neutrality," EIIW Discussion paper disbei177, Universitätsbibliothek Wuppertal, University Library.
    9. Gregory S. Crawford, 2015. "The economics of television and online video markets," ECON - Working Papers 197, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    10. D. Lanzi & M. Marzo, 2004. "Content Delivery and Vertical Integration in O-L Content Markets," Working Papers 513, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    11. Crawford, Gregory, 2015. "The Economics of Television and Online Video Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 10676, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Christiaan Hogendorn, 2004. "Broadband Internet: Open Access and Content Competition," Wesleyan Economics Working Papers 2004-002, Wesleyan University, Department of Economics.
    13. Foros, Oystein, 2004. "Strategic investments with spillovers, vertical integration and foreclosure in the broadband access market," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 1-24, January.
    14. Hervas-Drane, Andres, 2011. "Non-cost-raising discrimination: A rationale for functional separation in broadband open access," IESE Research Papers D/942, IESE Business School.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jindec:v:49:y:2001:i:3:p:299-318. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0022-1821 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.