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The Determinants Of Hazardous Waste Disposal Choice: An Empirical Analysis Of Halogenated Solvent Waste Shipments

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  • ANNA ALBERINI
  • JOHN BARTHOLOMEW
Abstract
Disposal of hazardous waste is more complex than simply choosing the option with the lowest price: Legislation may hold a waste generator responsible for cleaning up a badly contaminated waste disposal site if the operator of that site goes bankrupt. This paper estimates conditional logit models of a generator's choice of waste management facility (TSDF) for shipments of halogenated solvent waste originating in California in 1995. The probability that a facility is selected as the destination of a shipment depends on the cost of shipping to and disposal at the facility, on existing contamination at the site, and on the track record of the facility, suggesting that generators do seem to balance current disposal costs with the likelihood of future liability. There is no evidence that generators prefer facilities owned by publicly traded firms, but when generators do choose TSDFs belonging to a publicly traded company, they prefer wealthier companies. (JEL Q21)

Suggested Citation

  • Anna Alberini & John Bartholomew, 1999. "The Determinants Of Hazardous Waste Disposal Choice: An Empirical Analysis Of Halogenated Solvent Waste Shipments," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 17(3), pages 309-320, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:coecpo:v:17:y:1999:i:3:p:309-320
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1465-7287.1999.tb00684.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Sigman, Hilary, 1996. "The Effects of Hazardous Waste Taxes on Waste Generation and Disposal," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 199-217, March.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Jaime Vallés-Giménez & Anabel Zárate-Marco, 2021. "A Spatial Dynamic Model for Export Intensity of Hazardous Industrial Waste: The Incentive Effect of Regional Environmental Policies," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 80(4), pages 859-888, December.
    3. Sarah L. Stafford, 2005. "Can Consumers Enforce Environmental Regulations? The Role of the Market in Hazardous Waste Compliance," Working Papers 19, Department of Economics, College of William and Mary.
    4. Hilary Sigman, 2003. "Taxing Hazardous Waste: The U.S. Experience," Departmental Working Papers 200306, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
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    6. Jen Baggs, 2009. "International Trade in Hazardous Waste," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(1), pages 1-16, February.
    7. Anna Alberini & Kathleen Segerson, 2002. "Assessing Voluntary Programs to Improve Environmental Quality," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 22(1), pages 157-184, June.
    8. Christa Court & Stuart McIntyre, 2010. "What Causes Waste Flows? An Interregional Analysis of Welsh Waste Shipments," Working Papers Working Paper 2010-11, Regional Research Institute, West Virginia University.
    9. Anna Alberini & Shelby Frost, 2007. "Forcing Firms to Think About the Future: Economic Incentives and the Fate of Hazardous Waste," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 36(4), pages 451-474, April.
    10. Sarah Stafford, 2007. "Can consumers enforce environmental regulations? The role of the market in hazardous waste compliance," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 83-107, February.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • Q21 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Demand and Supply; Prices

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