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Toward an Optimal Oil and Gas Leasing System

Author

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  • Walter J. Mead
Abstract
The four principal leasing systems-work program, royalty, profit share (including rent resource tax), and bonus bidding are reviewed relative to their efficiency in maximizing and collecting the present value of economic rents. Empirical research is shown to support theoretical conclusions that the most efficient system appears to be bonus bidding, without a fixed royalty, with leases issued in perpetuity, with environmental and other regulations required to pass a benefit/cost test, and with elimination of any nationalistic or other barriers to entry.

Suggested Citation

  • Walter J. Mead, 1994. "Toward an Optimal Oil and Gas Leasing System," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 4), pages 1-18.
    • Handle: RePEc:aen:journl:1994v15-04-a01
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Kemp, Alexander G. & Kasim, Sola A., 2007. "A longitudinal study of fallow dynamics in the UK Continental Shelf (UKCS)," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 1744-1760, March.
    2. Griffin, Robert, 2013. "Auction designs for allocating wind energy leases on the U.S. outer continentalshelf," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 603-611.
    3. Sunnevag, Kjell J., 2000. "Designing auctions for offshore petroleum lease allocation," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 3-16, March.
    4. Sunnevag, Kjell J., 2002. "Auctions combined with ex post taxation--expected revenue when three parties want a piece of the cake," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 28(1-2), pages 49-59.
    5. Gonzalez, Patrick, 2013. "Taxing a Natural Resource with a Minimum Revenue Requirement," Working Papers 158572, University of Laval, Center for Research on the Economics of the Environment, Agri-food, Transports and Energy (CREATE).
    6. Iledare, Omowumi O. & Pulsipher, Allan G., 2007. "Joint bidding restriction policy for selective E&P firms in the US Gulf of Mexico OCS: How persuasive is its effectiveness?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(6), pages 3126-3133, June.
    7. John Brätland, 2012. "Timing “Externalities” Imposed by Mineral Ownership Law: Coasean Versus Lockean Remedies," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 28(Fall 2012), pages 61-77.
    8. Iledare, Omowumi O. & Pulsipher, Allan G. & Olatubi, Williams O. & Mesyanzhinov, Dmitry V., 2004. "An empirical analysis of the determinants of high bonus bids for petroleum leases in the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf (OCS)," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 239-259, March.
    9. Gunton, Cameron & Gunton, Thomas & Batson, Joshua & Markey, Sean & Dale, Daniel, 2021. "Designing fiscal regimes for impact benefit agreements," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    10. Bobylev, Yuri & Rasenko, Olesya, 2017. "Comparative Analysis of Tax Regimes in the Oil Sector," Working Papers 041723, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F0 - International Economics - - General

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