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Leader Selection and Service Delivery in Community Groups: Experimental Evidence from Uganda

Author

Listed:
  • Erika Deserranno
  • Miri Stryjan
  • Munshi Sulaiman
Abstract
In developing countries, NGOs and governments often rely on local groups for the delivery of financial and public services. This paper studies how the design of rules used for group leader selection affects leader identity and shapes service delivery. To do so, we randomly assign newly formed savings and loan groups to select their leaders using either a public discussion procedure or a private vote procedure. Leaders selected with a private vote are found to be less positively selected on socioeconomic characteristics. This results in groups that are more inclusive toward poor members, without being less economically efficient.

Suggested Citation

  • Erika Deserranno & Miri Stryjan & Munshi Sulaiman, 2019. "Leader Selection and Service Delivery in Community Groups: Experimental Evidence from Uganda," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 240-267, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejapp:v:11:y:2019:i:4:p:240-67
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/app.20180248
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Abramovsky, Laura & Augsburg, Britta & Lührmann, Melanie & Oteiza, Francisco & Rud, Juan Pablo, 2023. "Community matters: Heterogeneous impacts of a sanitation intervention," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 165(C).
    2. Weidmann, Ben & Vecci, Joseph & Said, Farah & Deming, David & Bhalotra, Sonia, 2024. "How Do You Find A Good Manager?," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 715, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    3. Yuehao Bai, 2022. "Optimality of Matched-Pair Designs in Randomized Controlled Trials," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(12), pages 3911-3940, December.
    4. Pushkar Maitra & Sandip Mitra & Dilip Mookherjee & Sujata Visaria, 2020. "Decentralized Targeting of Agricultural Credit Programs: Private versus Political Intermediaries," HKUST IEMS Working Paper Series 2020-70, HKUST Institute for Emerging Market Studies, revised Jan 2020.
    5. Baird, Sarah & McIntosh, Craig & Özler, Berk & Pape, Utz, 2024. "Asset transfers and anti-poverty programs: Experimental evidence from Tanzania," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 166(C).
    6. Oriana Bandiera & Robin Burgess & Erika Deserranno & Ricardo Morel & Munshi Sulaiman & Imran Rasul, 2023. "Social Incentives, Delivery Agents, and the Effectiveness of Development Interventions," Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 1(1), pages 162-224.
    7. Deserranno, Erika & Bandiera, Oriana & Rasul, Imran, 2020. "Development Policy through the Lens of Social Structure," CEPR Discussion Papers 14876, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Yuehao Bai, 2022. "Optimality of Matched-Pair Designs in Randomized Controlled Trials," Papers 2206.07845, arXiv.org.
    9. Alfredo Burlando & Andrea Canidio & Rebekah Selby, 2021. "The Economics Of Savings Groups," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 62(4), pages 1569-1598, November.
    10. Nourani, Vesall & Maertens, Annemie & Michelson, Hope, 2021. "Public good provision and democracy: Evidence from an experiment with farmer groups in Malawi," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 145(C).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • O16 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • O22 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - Project Analysis
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

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