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Party System Compactness: Measurement and Consequences

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  • Alvarez, R. Michael
  • Nagler, Jonathan
Abstract
An important property of any party system is the set of choices it presents to the electorate. In this paper we analyze the distribution of parties relative to voters in the multidimensional issue space and introduce two measures of the dispersion of the parties in the issue space relative to the voters, which we call measures of the compactness of the parties in the issue space. We show how compactness is easily computed using standard survey items found on national election surveys. Because we study the spacing of the parties relative to the distribution of the voters, we produce metric-free measures of compactness of the party system. The measures can be used to compare party systems across issues, over time within countries, and across countries. Comparing the compactness of party systems across countries allows us to determine the relative amount of issue choice afforded voters in different polities. We examine the compactness of the issue space and test the impact it has on voter choice in four countries: the United States, the Netherlands, Canada, and Great Britain. We demonstrate that the more compact the distribution of the parties in the issue space on any given issue, the less voters weight that issue in their vote decision. Thus we provide evidence supporting theories suggesting that the greater the choice offered by the parties in an election, the more likely it is that issue voting will play a major role in that election.

Suggested Citation

  • Alvarez, R. Michael & Nagler, Jonathan, 2004. "Party System Compactness: Measurement and Consequences," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 12(1), pages 46-62, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:polals:v:12:y:2004:i:01:p:46-62_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Stephen FERRIS & Marcel-Cristian VOIA, 2022. "Do Rival Political Parties Enforce Government Efficiency? Evidence from Canada, 1867 - 2021," LEO Working Papers / DR LEO 2948, Orleans Economics Laboratory / Laboratoire d'Economie d'Orleans (LEO), University of Orleans.
    2. Sofia Vasilopoulou & Katjana Gattermann, 2021. "Does Politicization Matter for EU Representation? A Comparison of Four European Parliament Elections," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(3), pages 661-678, May.
    3. Ingrid Mauerer & Gerhard Tutz, 2023. "Heterogeneity in general multinomial choice models," Statistical Methods & Applications, Springer;Società Italiana di Statistica, vol. 32(1), pages 129-148, March.
    4. Saiegh, Sebastián, 2014. "Partisanship, Ideology, and Representation in Latin America," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 6607, Inter-American Development Bank.
    5. Zhihao Yu, 2022. "Why Are Tobacco and Alcohol Control Policies So Different?–A Political-Economy Explanation," Carleton Economic Papers 22-05, Carleton University, Department of Economics.
    6. Sebastián Saiegh, 2014. "Partisanship, Ideology, and Representation in Latin America," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 86258, Inter-American Development Bank.
    7. Royce Carroll & Hiroki Kubo, 2018. "Polarization and ideological congruence between parties and supporters in Europe," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 176(1), pages 247-265, July.
    8. Matt Golder & Jacek Stramski, 2010. "Ideological Congruence and Electoral Institutions," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(1), pages 90-106, January.
    9. Shane Singh, 2014. "Linear and quadratic utility loss functions in voting behavior research," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 26(1), pages 35-58, January.
    10. Ferris, J. Stephen & Voia, Marcel-Cristian, 2023. "Do rival political parties enforce government efficiency? Evidence from Canada 1867–2021," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
    11. Katjana Gattermann, 2013. "News about the European Parliament: Patterns and external drivers of broadsheet coverage," European Union Politics, , vol. 14(3), pages 436-457, September.

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