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International Organizations as Policy Advisors

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  • Fang, Songying
  • Stone, Randall W.
Abstract
How can international organizations persuade governments to adopt policy recommendations that are based on private information when their interests conflict? We develop a game-theoretic model of persuasion that applies regardless of regime type and does not rely on the existence of domestic constituency constraints. In the model, an international organization (IO) and a domestic expert have private information about a crisis, but their preferences diverge from those of the government, which must choose whether to delegate decision making to the expert. Persuasion can take place if the international institution is able to send a credible signal. We find that this can take place only if the preferences of the IO and the domestic expert diverge and the institution holds the more moderate policy position. This result contrasts with conventional wisdom, which holds that the necessary condition for IOs to exert influence is support from a domestic constituency with aligned preferences. Our model suggests that, far from being an obstacle to international cooperation, polarized domestic politics may be a necessary condition for IOs to exert effective influence.

Suggested Citation

  • Fang, Songying & Stone, Randall W., 2012. "International Organizations as Policy Advisors," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 66(4), pages 537-569, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:intorg:v:66:y:2012:i:04:p:537-569_00
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Samuel Brazys & Krishna Chaitanya Vadlamannati & Tianyang Song, 2019. "Which Wheel Gets the Grease? Constituent Agency and Sub-national World Bank Aid Allocation," Working Papers 201907, Geary Institute, University College Dublin.
    2. Randall Stone, 2013. "Informal governance in international organizations: Introduction to the special issue," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 121-136, June.
    3. James D. Morrow & Kevin L. Cope, 2021. "The limits of information revelation in multilateral negotiations: A theory of treatymaking," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 33(4), pages 399-429, October.
    4. Randall W. Stone, 2017. "Stephen C. Nelson. 2017. The Currency of Confidence: How Economic Beliefs Shape the IMF’s Relationship with its Borrowers (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press)," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 643-645, December.
    5. Ece Kural & Lisa Maria Dellmuth & Maria-Therese Gustafsson, 2021. "International organizations and climate change adaptation: A new dataset for the social scientific study of adaptation, 1990–2017," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 16(9), pages 1-18, September.
    6. Luis Alfonso Dau & Elizabeth M. Moore & Jonathan P. Doh & Margaret A. Soto, 2022. "Does global integration stimulate corporate citizenship? The effect of international trade agreements and regulatory quality on state and private firm adoption of CSR standards," Journal of International Business Policy, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 5(3), pages 328-352, September.
    7. Mareike Kleine, 2013. "Knowing your limits: Informal governance and judgment in the EU," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 245-264, June.
    8. Jeffrey Chwieroth, 2013. "“The silent revolution:” How the staff exercise informal governance over IMF lending," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 265-290, June.

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