[go: up one dir, main page]
IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cje/issued/v24y1991i3p679-85.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Closed-Loop Motive for Voluntary Export Restraints

Author

Listed:
  • Engelbert J. Dockner
  • Alfred A. Haug
Abstract
This paper examines the effects of voluntary export restraints in a dynamic game model of duopolistic competition. It is shown that the imposition of a voluntary export restraint at the free-trade level of imports increases the market price and the profits of all firms in the industry if free trade is identified as the closed-loop (subgame-perfect) Cournot equilibrium of the game. Hence, the authors conclude that the predictions of static Cournot competition do not carry over to the dynamic case.

Suggested Citation

  • Engelbert J. Dockner & Alfred A. Haug, 1991. "The Closed-Loop Motive for Voluntary Export Restraints," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 24(3), pages 679-685, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:24:y:1991:i:3:p:679-85
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0008-4085%28199108%2924%3A3%3C679%3ATCMFVE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-G
    Download Restriction: only available to JSTOR subscribers
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Kenji Fujiwara, 2010. "When Are Voluntary Export Restraints Voluntary? A Differential Game Approach," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(2), pages 101-110, June.
    2. Açıkgöz, Ömer T. & Benchekroun, Hassan, 2017. "Anticipated international environmental agreements," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 306-336.
    3. Roberto Cellini & Luca Lambertini, 2006. "Workers’ enterprises are not perverse: differential oligopoly games with sticky price," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 10(3), pages 233-248, December.
    4. Giacomo Calzolari & Luca Lambertini, 2006. "Tariffs vs Quotas in a Model of Trade with Capital Accumulation," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(4), pages 632-644, September.
    5. Steffen Jørgensen & Ngo Long & Gerhard Sorger, 2018. "Preface: Special issue of Dynamic Games and Applications in Memory of Professor Engelbert J. Dockner," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 457-467, September.
    6. Luca Lambertini & Arsen Palestini, 2018. "Voluntary Export Restraints in a Trade Model with Sticky Price: Linear and Nonlinear Feedback Solutions," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 507-518, September.
    7. Mehdi Fadaee & Hamideh Esfahani, 2023. "Do oligopolistic firms benefit from being forced to act non‐strategically?," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 19(1), pages 127-147, March.
    8. Benchekroun, Hassan, 2003. "Unilateral production restrictions in a dynamic duopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 111(2), pages 214-239, August.
    9. Hassan Benchekroun & Ngo Long, 2018. "Nurturing an Infant Industry by Markovian Subsidy Schemes," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 519-541, September.
    10. Cellini, Roberto & Lambertini, Luca, 2007. "A differential oligopoly game with differentiated goods and sticky prices," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 176(2), pages 1131-1144, January.
    11. Benchekroun, Hassan & Ray Chaudhuri, Amrita, 2014. "Transboundary pollution and clean technologies," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 601-619.
    12. R. Cellini & L. Lambertini, 2000. "Dynamic Oligopoly with Sticky Prices: Closed-Loop,Feedback and Open-Loop Solutions," Working Papers 393, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    13. Calzolari, Giacomo & Lambertini, Luca, 2007. "Export restraints in a model of trade with capital accumulation," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 31(12), pages 3822-3842, December.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:24:y:1991:i:3:p:679-85. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Prof. Werner Antweiler (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ceaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.