Paper 2016/420
A note on the security of threshold implementations with $d+1$ input shares
Santos Merino Del Pozo and François-Xavier Standaert
Abstract
Recently, threshold implementations (TI) with $d + 1$ input shares have been proposed at Crypto 2015. This optimization aims for more lightweight TI designs while keeping the glitch-resistance of the original concept. In this note, we consider such an approach and provide preliminary simulation-based evidence, backed by empirical results, of the existence of $d^{\text{th}}$-order leakages. We conclude that, while for first-order TI designs this solution can be overkill due to the extra randomness requirements, higher-order TIs can still benefit from it.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- threshold implementationsmasking
- Contact author(s)
- santos merino @ uclouvain be
- History
- 2016-05-01: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2016/420
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2016/420,
author = {Santos Merino Del Pozo and François-Xavier Standaert},
title = {A note on the security of threshold implementations with $d+1$ input shares},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2016/420},
year = {2016},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/420}
}