JAPAN'S PHOENIX ECONOMY

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GoĹÄ: pawel-l Re: JAPAN'S PHOENIX ECONOMY IP: *.prochem.com.pl / 1.0.12.* 06.02.03, 09:58

Before succumbing to extreme
financial excess in the late eighties, Japan made truly
incredible economic progress for several decades. Sadly,
the Japanese "drank the poison" and basically destroyed
their financial system in a few short years. Yet, post-
Bubble Japan remained endowed with great wealth-creating
manufacturing capacity. The Japanese multinationals have
not only survived; they have prospered. With enormous trade
surpluses, the economy has been able to muddle through a
wrenching decade-long financial quagmire.

The related trade surplus and household saving attributes
(Japan as a creditor nation) played an instrumental role in
supporting the Japanese currency. The yen today trades at
about 120 to the dollar, just off its 10-year average and
above where it began the nineties. Importantly, and
especially for retirees, the frugal Japanese saver has
maintained her purchasing power. There has been no run on
Japanese financial assets.

The Japanese Credit Bubble was a severe domestic debt
problem, but international investors and speculators played
a relatively insignificant role. The fate of the financial
system and economy did not rest tenuously on yen
confidence. The post-Bubble banking system has been an
unmitigated disaster, but the Japanese economy's debt
structures - supported by decades of sound investment and
enormous household savings - proved resilient.

Stagnant private sector credit growth was partially offset
by large government borrowing, playing a critical role in
tempering financial fragility and stabilizing the system.
Excesses, both real and financial, had not reached the
point where contracting private-sector debt growth would
lead to unmanageable collapse. Fortunately, I would argue,
the Japanese government used its fiscal and monetary powers
to ease an arduous post-Bubble transition, rather than to
sustain the Bubble.

While certainly encumbered, Japanese society has remained
cohesive through a protracted and difficult adjustment
period. The general population has not rioted or spent much
time in protest, but rather fell back on financial
discipline and its hard-work ethic. There has been too much
(typical post-Bubble) talk of policy incompetence and not
enough recognition of a most impressive performance by the
Japanese people.
- GoĹÄ: rybb Re: JAPAN'S PHOENIX ECONOMY IP: *.sgh.waw.pl 06.02.03, 12:00
  
  Gość portalu: pawel-l napisał(a):
  
  > Before succumbing to extreme
  > financial excess in the late eighties, Japan made truly
  > incredible economic progress for several decades. Sadly,
  > the Japanese "drank the poison" and basically destroyed
  > their financial system in a few short years. Yet, post-
  > Bubble Japan remained endowed with great wealth-creating
  > manufacturing capacity. The Japanese multinationals have
  > not only survived; they have prospered. With enormous trade
  > surpluses, the economy has been able to muddle through a
  > wrenching decade-long financial quagmire.
  >
  > The related trade surplus and household saving attributes
  > (Japan as a creditor nation) played an instrumental role in
  > supporting the Japanese currency. The yen today trades at
  > about 120 to the dollar, just off its 10-year average and
  > above where it began the nineties. Importantly, and
  > especially for retirees, the frugal Japanese saver has
  > maintained her purchasing power. There has been no run on
  > Japanese financial assets.
  >
  > The Japanese Credit Bubble was a severe domestic debt
  > problem, but international investors and speculators played
  > a relatively insignificant role. The fate of the financial
  > system and economy did not rest tenuously on yen
  > confidence. The post-Bubble banking system has been an
  > unmitigated disaster, but the Japanese economy's debt
  > structures - supported by decades of sound investment and
  > enormous household savings - proved resilient.
  >
  > Stagnant private sector credit growth was partially offset
  > by large government borrowing, playing a critical role in
  > tempering financial fragility and stabilizing the system.
  > Excesses, both real and financial, had not reached the
  > point where contracting private-sector debt growth would
  > lead to unmanageable collapse. Fortunately, I would argue,
  > the Japanese government used its fiscal and monetary powers
  > to ease an arduous post-Bubble transition, rather than to
  > sustain the Bubble.
  >
  > While certainly encumbered, Japanese society has remained
  > cohesive through a protracted and difficult adjustment
  > period. The general population has not rioted or spent much
  > time in protest, but rather fell back on financial
  > discipline and its hard-work ethic. There has been too much
  > (typical post-Bubble) talk of policy incompetence and not
  > enough recognition of a most impressive performance by the
  > Japanese people.
  
  i oto cala specyfika japonskiego kryzysu. jak spojrzysz na ludzi, ich nawyki i
  podejscie do zycia nigdy bys nie zgadl ze od 10 lat kraj ten jest w kryzysie.
  najciekawsze jest to ile pieniedzy na rozrzutny styl zycia maja Japonczycy w
  bankach. jakby zaczeli to wydawac to boom zapewniony. problem chyba polega
  polega na tym ze nie maja a) czasu zeby wydawac b) potrzeby zeby wydawac coraz
  to wiecej i wiecej jak Amerykanie (co nie zmienia faktu ze wiekszosc
  Japonczykow ubiera sie u najlepszych projektantow i nigdy sobie nie poskromia
  wydatkow na najnowsza konsole czy gre, a podrozuja nie mniej intensywnie niz w
  latach 80tych, choc teraz preferuja lokalizacje blizsze ojczyznie jak chocby
  Australia). ten okres kryzys jest zludny bo nie przyczynil sie ani do spadku
  jakosci zycia przecietnego Japonczyka, ani do znaczacego spadku zatrudnienia
  (choc jest to problem w duzej mierze strukturalny) ani do uszczuplenia ich
  portfeli. lata 90te to jest okres nijakosci, co widac wyraznie po obejrzeniu
  paru znakomitszych dziel filmowych japonskich lat 90tych (chocby nawet
  przydlugawy Eureka ). zadnych oszalamiajacych reform, zmian ani wydarzen. po
  prostu zycie z nabierajacym impetem pragnienia odmiany.
  
  ten spis obserwacji nie jest w sumie moj tylko znajomej co spedzila w Japonii 1
  rok. pozwolilem sobie jednak na drobna kradziez mysli.
  - GoĹÄ: pawel-l Re: JAPAN'S PHOENIX ECONOMY IP: *.prochem.com.pl / 1.0.12.* 06.02.03, 13:11
    
    I dlatego Japonii bliżej do otrząśnięcia się z 10 letniego marazmu niż Europie
    czy US.
    - GoĹÄ: MACIEJ Re: JAPAN'S PHOENIX ECONOMY IP: *.ny325.east.verizon.net 06.02.03, 19:25
      
      Gość portalu: pawel-l napisał(a):
      
      > I dlatego Japonii bliżej do otrząśnięcia się z 10 letniego marazmu niż
      Europie
      > czy US.
      
      Najwyrazniej nie zrozumiales artykulu.
      Przeczytaj go jeszcze raz od dechy do dechy i znajdziesz tam porownania do USA.
      No wiec przy zderegulowanej ,otwartej gospodarce w USA nie wystepuja tu zadne
      problemy dreczace Japonie.
      Czym gospodarka jest bardziej przeregulowana,jak np EU.gdzie wystepuja doplaty
      do rolnictwa i galezi exportowych ,tym bardziej zacofane te dotowane galezie
      gospodarki staja sie.
  - darr.darek a na czym te japonskie problemy polegaja 06.02.03, 14:43
    
    www.nytimes.com Jan 29-2003
    From 1975 to 1990 Japan grew at 4% a year.
    Japan is dysfunctional hybrid of super efficient exporting industries,and
    super inefficient domestic sector.
    Efficient exports total no more than 20% of the entire economy.
    Meanwhile,most Japanese live and work in another Japan that is shielded
    from both imports and domestic competition.
    Nonperforming loans in Japan today amount to almost 20% of GDP.
    In USA it is only 2,4% of GDP.
    Manufacturing output now in Japan is 10% below its 1991 peak.
    
    A JA DOSZEDLEM DO TEGO MAJAC WYLACZNIE DANE O DEFLACJI, SPADKU WARTOSCI JENA I
    POROWNUJAC CENY NAJLEPSZYCH JAPONSKICH PRODUKTOW W OKRESIE OSTATNICH KILKU LAT
    (Toyota Carina/Avensis kosztowala 7lat temu ok.1.3mln JPY , dzis ok.2mln
    JPY) . Dobry jestem z tym wyciaganiem wnioskow :) .
    
    Gość portalu: rybb napisał(a):
    > najciekawsze jest to ile pieniedzy na rozrzutny styl zycia maja Japonczycy w
    > bankach. jakby zaczeli to wydawac to boom zapewniony. problem chyba polega
    > polega na tym ze nie maja a)czasu zeby wydawac b)potrzeby zeby wydawac coraz
    > to wiecej i wiecej jak Amerykanie
    
    rybb , to nie jest zaden problem popytu .
    
    80% przedsiebiorstw nalezy do nieefektywnej, zadluzonej czesi gospodarki
    japonskiej .
    Przyklad :
    To , ze jakis czerwony "ekonomista" dalby polskiemu kupcowi panu
    Mietkowi "klientele" , to nie znaczy, ze jego szopy-skley zmienia sie w
    wielkie sklady supermarketow , a pracownik Heniu dowozacy i zwalajacy na kupe
    zapasy przprzeksztalci sie w dopracowany system logistyczny . Czujesz temat ?
    Tutaj "ochrona" , "dawanie rynku" , "stymulowanie popytu" i "preferencyjne
    kredyty" dla pana Mietka, skonczylyby sie zacofaniem calej gospodarki .
    To ,niestety,dzieje sie w Polsce czerwonych szmat w wladzy i to , niestety,
    dzialo sie w Japonii .
    - GoĹÄ: MACIEJ LEKTURA OBOWIAZKOWA NA I ROKU STUDIOW IP: *.ny325.east.verizon.net 07.02.03, 04:40
      
      darr.darek napisał:
      
      > www.nytimes.com Jan 29-2003
      > From 1975 to 1990 Japan grew at 4% a year.
      > Japan is dysfunctional hybrid of super efficient exporting industries,and
      > super inefficient domestic sector.
      > Efficient exports total no more than 20% of the entire economy.
      > Meanwhile,most Japanese live and work in another Japan that is shielded
      > from both imports and domestic competition.
      > Nonperforming loans in Japan today amount to almost 20% of GDP.
      > In USA it is only 2,4% of GDP.
      > Manufacturing output now in Japan is 10% below its 1991 peak.
      >
      > A JA DOSZEDLEM DO TEGO MAJAC WYLACZNIE DANE O DEFLACJI, SPADKU WARTOSCI JENA
      I
      > POROWNUJAC CENY NAJLEPSZYCH JAPONSKICH PRODUKTOW W OKRESIE OSTATNICH KILKU
      LAT
      > (Toyota Carina/Avensis kosztowala 7lat temu ok.1.3mln JPY , dzis ok.2mln
      > JPY) . Dobry jestem z tym wyciaganiem wnioskow :) .
      
      TEN ARTYKUL Z NYTIMES'A TO POWINNA BYC LEKTURA OBOWIAZKOWA NA PIERWSZYM ROKU
      STUDIOW KAZDEGO KIERUNKU-NIE TYLKO EKONOMICZNYCH.
      
      Pewne podstawy zarzadzania gospodarka powinny byc znane ne tylko Lepperowi ale
      i Millerowi i innym niemotom probujacym chronic gospodarke przed konkurencja
      swiatowa.
      EU zajmuje sie ochrona wlasnego rynku i dlatego wlasnie bedzie juz niedlugo
      nurkowac w poszukiwaniu Japonii i Titanica.
      
      > Gość portalu: rybb napisał(a):
      > > najciekawsze jest to ile pieniedzy na rozrzutny styl zycia maja Japonczycy
      > w
      > > bankach. jakby zaczeli to wydawac to boom zapewniony. problem chyba polega
      >
      > > polega na tym ze nie maja a)czasu zeby wydawac b)potrzeby zeby wydawac cor
      > az
      > > to wiecej i wiecej jak Amerykanie
      >
      > rybb , to nie jest zaden problem popytu .
      >
      > 80% przedsiebiorstw nalezy do nieefektywnej, zadluzonej czesi gospodarki
      > japonskiej .
      > Przyklad :
      > To , ze jakis czerwony "ekonomista" dalby polskiemu kupcowi panu
      > Mietkowi "klientele" , to nie znaczy, ze jego szopy-skley zmienia sie w
      > wielkie sklady supermarketow , a pracownik Heniu dowozacy i zwalajacy na kupe
      > zapasy przprzeksztalci sie w dopracowany system logistyczny . Czujesz temat ?
      > Tutaj "ochrona" , "dawanie rynku" , "stymulowanie popytu" i "preferencyjne
      > kredyty" dla pana Mietka, skonczylyby sie zacofaniem calej gospodarki .
      > To ,niestety,dzieje sie w Polsce czerwonych szmat w wladzy i to , niestety,
      > dzialo sie w Japonii .
      - GoĹÄ: pawel-l Re: LEKTURA OBOWIAZKOWA NA I ROKU STUDIOW IP: 1.0.12.* 07.02.03, 08:49
        
        Proponuję lepiej dobierać lektury
        
        www.daillyreconing.com archives
        
        The Japanese Wild Card
        "...Although both the U.S. and Japan share many comparable symptoms of a post-
        bubble distress, they are clearly at different stages of the economic cycle and
        concomitantly different phases of economic adjustment. In contrast to the US,
        the Japanese private financial sector has undergone a massive savings shift
        from deficit to surplus over the so-called “lost decade” of their post-bubble
        era. The Japanese stock market could appreciate more than the U.S. stock market
        in a global central bank bailout reflation..."
        
        --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        
        Marshall Auerback
        
        We have often been accused of inconsistency for criticising the Federal
        Reserve's recent promises for radical monetisation to avert a Japanese-style
        deflation, whilst simultaneously arguing for exactly that sort of policy
        prescription in Japan. We have chosen to open the New Year by addressing this
        apparent contradiction. Although both countries share many comparable symptoms
        of a post-bubble distress, they are clearly at different stages of the economic
        cycle and concomitantly different phases of economic adjustment. We think the
        relative time frames of the respective economies highlight a crucial
        distinction. Yes, the vigorous production of "Why We're Not Like Japan"
        articles has some validity; but such analyses should not provide US investors
        with any degree of comfort. On virtually any current comparison, Japan is far
        more amenable to improvement, given the savings swing from deficit to surplus
        in its private sector, than the US, which has spent all of its monetary bullets
        pre-empting, as opposed to accommodating, painful-but-necessary economic
        adjustment.
        
        Thus far, expectations (as opposed to actual implementation) of "radical
        monetization" in the US have not prevented a further stock market decline.
        Quite the contrary in fact: gold has risen to fresh 6 year highs, the dollar's
        fall has accelerated, and the months of November and December, historically
        amongst the best performing months for US equities, were disappointing to all
        those expecting a big "Santa Claus" rally. The Dow closed the year down for
        the third year in a row; the last time this occurred was during World War II.
        
        The process of adjustment in the US has not even started. Indeed, in contrast
        to the Bank of Japan's sincere, albeit, belated, attempts to act against its
        troubling asset bubble economy during the early 1990s under then Governor
        Yasushi Mieno, the Greenspan Federal Reserve has demonstrated no such
        comparable enthusiasm to address long prevailing imbalances in the US. The
        Federal Reserve has used its bullets to sustain the Credit Bubble and, despite
        assurances to the contrary, has little ammunition remaining for when it will be
        desperately needed. With rates approaching zero, amidst promises to do
        virtually anything to prevent deflation in America, investors are now calling
        the bluff of Messrs Greenspan and Bernanke. They are in effect daring the Fed
        to be as unconventional as possible, since neither the economy, nor financial
        markets, look amenable any longer to conventional monetary stimulus. The
        expectations management game that the Fed has played thus far has proved
        ineffective.
        
        Similarly, talk about monetization certainly hasn't helped the market in
        Japan. But we would argue that actual monetization on a large enough scale
        could eventually force a portfolio adjustment that would lift stock prices
        because (in contrast to the US), the Japanese private financial sector has
        undergone a massive savings shift from deficit to surplus over the so-
        called "lost decade" of their post-bubble era. Why is this the case? Let us
        assume the central banks of Japan and the U.S. both act to this degree on the
        next stock market decline. Which market will rally more?
        
        From a portfolio adjustment point of view, Japan is in a position to do much
        better. In Japan, households have had a decade to complete their stock
        liquidation. They have now adjusted to the extent that equities now comprise
        around 5% of total holdings (versus something closer to 40% at the peak of the
        bubble years). US households have barely begun their adjustment. We have had
        an unusual downturn thus far in the US, in that the private sector, which
        typically undergoes balance sheet repair in a recession, has not done so this
        time. The private sector has been a consistent savings surplus sector in the
        past and it has been more so during recessions. Even at the peak of the bubble
        in 1989, Japan's household savings sector was around 13%. In the late 1990's
        the U.S. private sector moved into an historically unprecedented financial
        deficit. Even more remarkable, this deficit failed to show much improvement in
        the recent recession.
        
        More extraordinary is the fact that policy has been geared to preclude this
        adjustment. In the midst of an unprecedented lending and speculative frenzy,
        both Alan Greenspan and Ben Bernanke were extolling their capacity to use
        the "logic of the printing press" to ward off any fledgling risk of
        a "deflationary" bust, much to the plaudits of the so-called "bond market
        vigilantes" (who, ironically, are today's most ardent inflationists). As he and
        his colleagues have recently hinted, the Greenspan Fed may have more
        instruments to keep the credit spigot open longer than most of us realise.
        That does not imply that private indebtedness can rise indefinitely; it only
        suggests that it may take a significant further rise in private indebtedness to
        lead to what Charles Kindleberger has termed "a credit revulsion". Perhaps
        2003 will be the year where this "credit revulsion" finally manifests itself.
        
        Because foreigners with past euphoric expectations bought a huge volume of U.S.
        stocks in the Bubble period and have yet to sell, and because the unsustainable
        U.S. current account deficit makes the U.S. dollar vulnerable, the U.S. stock
        market is very vulnerable to cross border flows. Consequently, the risks of a
        derivative/speculative unwind dollar/financial crisis along the lines of that
        experienced in Mexico in 1994, emerging Asia and Russia in 1998, or Argentina
        in 2002, remains exceedingly high.
        
        What about Japan? In Japan, foreign investors have bought and sold Japanese
        equities in waves. Recently, they have sold. Because Japan has a large
        current account surplus and has had one forever, its stock market has not been
        especially vulnerable to cross border flows. Nor is its economy prone to the
        type of destabilizing risks posed by a sudden withdrawal of overseas portfolio
        flows, as may be the case in America today.
        
        Of course, the bear case against Japan has been the consistently low level of
        corporate profitability. But there may be an explanation for this phenomenon
        which illustrates that however delinquent public policy making has been,
        corporate Japan has not stood still in making necessary adjustments.
        
        Consider the analysis of Brian Reading of Lombard Street Associates, a long-
        time observer of the economy. Reading makes a very simple point: there has
        been such a huge shift in the financial balance of the public sector, and
        enough of a decline in the household savings rate, that the financial balance
        of the corporate sector has swung from a 4% of GDP deficit in 1989 to a 6% of
        GDP surplus today. This implies that the corporate sector is generating cash
        flow far in excess of its investment requirements. Japanese companies are now
        able to reduce debt and buy back stock. For this to be the case, the corporate
        sector must be massively profitable. Japanese corporate accounts do not show
        such high profitability. Brian argues that, in complete contrast
        
        GoĹÄ: MACIEJ Re: LEKTURA OBOWIAZKOWA NA I ROKU STUDIOW IP: *.ny325.east.verizon.net 16.02.03, 02:42
        
        Japanese
        equities in waves. Recently, they have sold. Because Japan
        has a large
        current account surplus and has had one forever, its stock
        market has not been
        especially vulnerable to cross border flows. Nor is its
        economy prone to the
        type of destabilizing risks posed by a sudden withdrawal of
        overseas portfolio
        flows, as may be the case in America today.
        
        Of course, the bear case against Japan has been the
        consistently low level of
        corporate profitability. But there may be an explanation for
        this phenomenon
        which illustrates that however delinquent public policy
        making has been,
        corporate Japan has not stood still in making necessary
        adjustments.
        
        Consider the analysis of Brian Reading of Lombard Street
        Associates, a long-
        time observer of the economy. Reading makes a very simple
        point: there has
        been such a huge shift in the financial balance of the public
        sector, and
        enough of a decline in the household savings rate, that the
        financial balance
        of the corporate sector has swung from a 4% of GDP deficit in
        1989 to a 6% of
        GDP surplus today. This implies that the corporate sector is
        generating cash
        flow far in excess of its investment requirements. Japanese
        companies are now
        able to reduce debt and buy back stock. For this to be the
        case, the corporate
        sector must be massively profitable. Japanese corporate
        accounts do not show
        such high profitability. Brian argues that, in complete
        contrast
        
        Porownanie USA do Japonii nie ma najmniejszego sensu,bo Japonia byla i jest
        zamknietym rynkiem,gdzie niemal 80% gospodarki ma wydajnosc pracy 50% nizsza niz
        w USA.
        Caly sektor rolniczy w Japonii jest pod ochrona ,podobnie zreszta jak w EU.
        Dlatego te mamuty sa skazane na extinction.
        Zastapia je otwarte i wydajniejsze gospodarki USA,Chin.
        
        GoĹÄ: pawel-l Re: LEKTURA OBOWIAZKOWA NA I ROKU STUDIOW IP: 1.0.12.* 17.02.03, 10:00
        
        Jak sam przeczytałeś w Japonii dużo się zmienia na lepsze choć nie widać tego w
        raportach. Za to w Stanach dużo się zmienia na gorsze choć tego nie widać w
        raportach (choć już małym drukiem zaczyna się pojawiać- vide art. Boćkowskiego)

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