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System of people's congress

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The system of people's congress (Chinese: 人民代表大会制度; pinyin: Rénmín Dàibiǎo Dàhuì Zhìdù) under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is the form of government of the People's Republic of China (PRC), and is based on the principle of unified power, in which all state powers are vested in the National People's Congress (NPC). No separation of powers exists in the PRC. All state organs are elected by, answerable to, and have no separate powers than those granted to them by the NPC. By law, all elections at all levels must adhere to the leadership of the CCP.[1]

System

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According to the PRC constitution, all power belongs to the people, and National People's Congress and local people's congresses are the bodies through which the people exercise state power.[2][non-primary source needed] The NPC is officially China's highest organ of state power, with the Standing Committee being its permanent body.[2][non-primary source needed]

Levels

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The People's Congress System was set out in the Electoral Law of 1953 and has been subsequently revised.[3] Currently, there are five levels of people's congresses.[3] From more to less local, they are:[3]

  1. people's congresses in villages, minority nationality townships, and towns;
  2. people's congresses of cities that are not sub-divided, municipal districts, counties, and autonomous counties;
  3. people's congresses in sub-districts of larger cities and in autonomous prefectures;
  4. people's congresses in provinces, autonomous regions, and direct-administered municipalities; and
  5. the National People's Congress.

Direct elections occur at the two most local levels, while the members at the higher levels are indirectly elected, i.e., elected by those elected in the lower levels.[3] The size of the people's congresses increase with their administrative rank.[4] With some exceptions, township people's congresses usually have 40 to 130 deputies, county people's congresses from 120 to 450, prefectural people's congresses from 240 to 650, provincial people's congresses from 350 to 1,000, and the NPC at around 3,000. The total number of people's congresses throughout China at different levels is over 40,000, and the total number of deputies is in the hundreds of thousands.[4]

Role of the Chinese Communist Party

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Nominations at all levels are controlled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and the CCP's supreme position is enshrined in the state constitution, meaning that the elections have little way of influencing politics.[5][4] The CCP, through its control of the nomination process, ensures that around 70% of deputies to the people's congresses are party members.[4] The top positions in the system are granted to senior CCP leaders, including the position of the NPCSC chairman, who has always been a member of the Politburo Standing Committee, and the NPCSC vice chairperson positions.[4] Additionally, elections are not pluralistic as no opposition is allowed.[5]

The CCP has a central role in lawmaking, which has fluctuated over time.[6][7][8][9] The CCP effectively sits above any legal code and the constitution of the People's Republic of China.[10][11] CCP principles and slogans are codified into the state's legal code to increase the legitimacy of party rule.[10] The role of the CCP in lawmaking increased under CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping's tenure.[12] Through a variety of documents circulated within the CCP, the party directs China's lawmaking organs such as the NPC Standing Committee in the lawmaking process.[13]

See also

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References

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Citations

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  1. ^ Hao, Mingsong; Ke, Xiwang (5 July 2023). "Personal Networks and Grassroots Election Participation in China: Findings from the Chinese General Social Survey". Journal of Chinese Political Science. 29 (1): 159–184. doi:10.1007/s11366-023-09861-3. ISSN 1080-6954.
  2. ^ a b "About Congress". National People's Congress. Archived from the original on 24 September 2023. Retrieved 3 November 2023.
  3. ^ a b c d Boer 2021, p. 193.
  4. ^ a b c d e Truex 2016, p. 158–175.
  5. ^ a b "Democracy". Decoding China. Heidelberg University. 4 February 2021. Archived from the original on 2022-08-16. Retrieved 2022-08-22.
  6. ^ Tanner, Murray Scot (1994). "The Erosion of Communist Party Control over Lawmaking in China". The China Quarterly. 138 (138): 381–403. doi:10.1017/S0305741000035803. ISSN 0305-7410. JSTOR 654949. S2CID 154784276.
  7. ^ Chien-Min, Chao (2003-03-10). "The National People's Congress Oversight Power and the Role of the CCP". The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies. 17: 6–30. doi:10.22439/cjas.v17i0.11. ISSN 1395-4199.
  8. ^ Tanner, Murray Scot (March 1995). "How a Bill Becomes a Law in China: Stages and Processes in Lawmaking". The China Quarterly. 141: 39–64. doi:10.1017/S0305741000032902. ISSN 0305-7410. S2CID 154503140.
  9. ^ Chen, Jianfu; Li, Yuwen; Otto, Jan Michiel; Polak, Maurice V., eds. (2000-01-01). Law-Making in the People's Republic of China. Brill Publishers. doi:10.1163/9789004480933. ISBN 978-90-04-48093-3.
  10. ^ a b "Rule by law, with Chinese characteristics". The Economist. July 13, 2023. ISSN 0013-0613. Archived from the original on 2023-07-17. Retrieved 2023-07-22. The party sits above any legal code and even China's constitution, its powers unchecked by any court. Indeed, Mr Xi denounces judicial independence and the separation of powers as dangerous foreign ideas. Instead, to hear legal scholars explain it, Mr Xi is offering rule by law: ie, professional governance by officials following standardised procedures. At home, the party hopes that this sort of authoritarian rule will enjoy more legitimacy than a previously prevailing alternative: arbitrary decision-making by (often corrupt) officials.
  11. ^ Doshi, Rush (2021-09-30). The Long Game: China's Grand Strategy to Displace American Order (1 ed.). Oxford University Press. p. 35. doi:10.1093/oso/9780197527917.001.0001. ISBN 978-0-19-752791-7. OCLC 1256820870. The Party sits above the state, runs parallel to the state, and is enmeshed in every level of the state.
  12. ^ Economy, Elizabeth (2018). The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese State. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-086607-5.
  13. ^ Cao, Deborah (2017-03-02). Chinese Law: A Language Perspective (1 ed.). Routledge. doi:10.4324/9781315260419. ISBN 978-1-315-26041-9.

Works cited

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