Sohshulin/sandbox
Court	Privy Council
Full case name	Moses Hinds and Others v. The Queen
Decided	5 Nov 1975
Citations	[1977] AC 195 [1976] 2 WLR 366 [1976] 1 All ER 353
Transcript	Privy Council transcript
Court membership
Judges sitting	Lord Diplock Viscount Dilhorne Lord Simon of Glaisdale Lord Edmund-Davies Lord Fraser of Tullybelton
Keywords
Constitution Westminster model Separation of powers

Moses Hinds v. the Queen [1977] AC 195 (“Hinds”), was a landmark decision by the Privy Council, on appeal from the Jamaican Court of Appeal. It decided on the constitutional validity of the Gun Court Act 1974 (“the Act”).^[1] While not expressly provided, the court, by a majority of 3:2, held that the basic principle of separation of powers should be implied into the Jamaican Constitution (“the Constitution”).^[2] Following this principle, although the Parliament could establish new courts, judges of the new courts must be appointed on the terms laid down in the Constitution that applied to judges of pre-existing courts exercising an analogous jurisdiction. As a result, the provisions of the Act, to the extent that they provide for the establishment of a Full Court Division consisting of members of the lower judiciary exercising the jurisdiction and powers previously only vested in Supreme Court judges, were void. This case laid the first stone for the implication of separation of powers doctrine into other Constitutions which adopted the Westminster model.

Hinds was decided after the Constitution came into force in 1962 with the Jamaica Independence Act,^[3] which gave Jamaica political independence from the United Kingdom. Formerly a colony of the United Kingdom, the Constitution established a Westminster parliamentary system whose political and legal traditions follow those of the United Kingdom.^[4]

In 1974, the Parliament of Jamaica passed the Act as an ordinary Act of Parliament. This purported to establish a new court called the Gun Court to try “firearm offenses” in order to regulate the rising incidence of crimes of violence involving firearms.^[5]

The Act provided for three different divisions: Circuit Division, Resident Magistrate’s Division and Full Court Division. The Circuit Division is constituted by a “Supreme Court judge exercising the jurisdiction of a Circuit Court”.^[6][7] The Resident Magistrate’s Division is constituted by one Resident Magistrate and exercises the jurisdiction of a Resident Magistrate’s Court.^[8][9] The effect of the Act, vis-a-vis these two divisions, was to enlarge the pre-existing geographical ambit of the jurisdiction exercisable by a properly appointed Supreme Court judge and Resident Magistrate respectively. However, the Full Court Division had no analogous courts: it consisted of three Resident Magistrates who had jurisdiction, with the exception of capital offenses, over all firearms offense or other offense committed by a person detained for a firearms offense, and extended geographically to the entire country.^[10][11] This jurisdiction thus extended to all non-capital offenses which were triable only before a Circuit Court prior to the Act.

In the appeal, each of the five defendants were convicted in the Resident Magistrate’s Division of offenses involving the unlawful possession of firearms which carried with it the mandatory sentence.^[12] The mandatory sentence provided by s 13(1) of the Act^[13] of detention at hard labor determinable by the Government was passed on them. They appealed against the conviction and sentence at the Jamaican Court of Appeal, on the basis that the Act, or alternatively those provisions of the Act under which they had been tried, are inconsistent with the Constitution and are therefore void under s 2 of the Constitution.^[14]

The appeals of four of them were dismissed and only that of the fifth was allowed. The unsuccessful parties appealed to the Privy Council.

The main issue in the appeal was the constitutional validity of the three divisions of the Gun Court. Although all the defendants were tried only in the Resident Magistrate’s Division, determining the validity of the other two divisions were relevant as arguments were raised regarding the inseverability of every division with the Act.^[15]

A significant part of the judgment focused on the constitutionality of the Full Court Division as the Parliament’s creation of this division involved “a different composition [and jurisdiction] from any previously existing court in Jamaica”.^[16] The issue was whether the Parliament, in exercising its legislative power in creating the Full Court Division, resulted in a transfer of judicial power that improperly encroached on the jurisdiction reserved for the Supreme Court. This turned on a discussion of whether the doctrine of separation of powers could be implied into the Constitution in the first place.

The interpretation of Chapter VII of the Constitution, which includes the Parliament’s right in altering the qualifications, remuneration and conditions of service in the appointment of judges,^[17] was also key in determining the ambit of the Parliament’s powers in transferring jurisdiction.

Lastly. there was also an issue of whether the Act, in allowing the appointment of the Resident Magistrate to the Full Court Division by the Chief Justice,^[18] was a contravention of s 112(1) which requires appointment of new judges by the Governor-General on the advice of the Judicial Service Commission.^[19]

Lord Diplock, Lord Simon of Glaisdale and Lord Edmund-Davies gave the judgement of the majority.

1. Interpretation of the Constitution - Separation of powers doctrine
The majority opined that a written constitution should be construed in light of its surrounding circumstances and subject matter.^[20] The circumstances in which the Jamaican Constitution was drafted involved its drafters being educated in the tradition of English public law where the doctrine of separation of powers is firmly entrenched. Further, as to the subject matter, Jamaica was governed as a British colony under a system of public law and its institutional framework reflected the same doctrine.^[21] On achieving independence, the enactment of the written Constitution was “evolutionary not revolutionary”, and as such, the continuity of governance would have imported the separation of powers doctrine through independence.^[22]

Unlike ordinary statutes, the absence of express words in constitutional documents does not prevent the necessary implication of the separation of powers doctrine in light of the socio-political context as explained above.^[23]

Furthermore, all Westminster Constitutions deal with each branch of the government under separate Chapter headings. Notably, Chapter VII of the Constitution^[24] deals with the method of appointment and security of tenure of the judges to ensure judicial independence, which further bolsters the implication of the separation of powers doctrine.^[25]

2. Ambit of Parliament’s legislative power in transferring jurisdiction
The Parliament can provide for the establishment of new courts from time to time. It can transfer to these new courts jurisdiction previously exercisable by existing courts. It was held that the Parliament’s legislative power in this regard, however, is subject to certain limits.^[26] Following Liyanage v. The Queen [1967] 1 AC 259^[27], the court held:

...judicial power, however it be distributed from time to time between various courts, is to continue to be vested in persons appointed to hold judicial office in the manner and on the terms laid down in the Chapter dealing with the judicature, even though this is not expressly stated in the Constitution. [emphasis added]^[28]

Thus, any transfer of judicial power to judges of new courts will only be valid if the judge was appointed with the same method of appointment and given the same security of tenure as required by the Constitution for a judge of an existing court with an analogous jurisdiction.^[29]

The court also held that it is immaterial that the label of the new court is not expressly governed by the Constitution. Following The Attorney-General of Australia v. The Queen [1957] A.C. 288,^[30] it was said:

It is the substance of the law that must be regarded, not the form. What is the nature of the jurisdiction to be exercised by the judges who are to compose the court to which the new label is attached? Does the method of their appointment and the security of their tenure conform to the requirements of the constitution applicable to judges who at the time of the constitution came into force, exercised jurisdiction of that nature? [emphasis added]^[31]

As such, if the Parliament were allowed to transfer jurisdiction to judges of new courts without having to be appointed in the same manner as stipulated in the Constitution, the supremacy of the Constitution would be undermined.^[32]

It was also mentioned that, if judicial power were allowed to be exercised by persons without the same amount of protection afforded by Chapter VII, the citizen could be deprived of the safeguard of judicial independence from local legislative and executive pressures. This was an important factor in Hinds as the higher judiciary (which includes judges of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal) were given a greater security of tenure than the lower judiciary (which includes the Resident Magistrate’s Court) in the Constitution.^[33]

However, the respondent contended that the Parliament is entitled to downgrade the jurisdiction previously only exercisable by the higher judiciary. In support of this contention, reference to s 97 (1) of the Constitution^[34] was made^[35], which provides:

“There shall be a Supreme Court for Jamaica which shall have such jurisdiction and powers as may be conferred upon it by the Constitution or any other law…”^[36]

The court disagreed with the respondent, drawing analogy to the Court of Appeal’s jurisdiction.^[37] Section 110 of the Constitution makes it apparent that s 103(1)^[38] vests the Court of Appeal its appellate jurisdiction.^[39] Therefore, Parliament cannot by ordinary law deprive the Court of Appeal a significant part of its appellate jurisdiction; nor can it confer such jurisdiction upon judges who do not enjoy the security of tenure guaranteed to the Court of Appeal judges.^[40] Otherwise s110 of the Constitution^[41] would be rendered nugatory. Thus, similarly, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court cannot be downgraded.

3. Transfer of judicial powers
Circuit Court Division
The Act in question merely expanded the geographical jurisdiction of a Supreme Court judge of the Circuit Court. As this was not prohibited by the Constitution, Parliament can expand the geographical limit of the jurisdiction of a Supreme Court judge.^[42]

Resident Magistrate’s Division
For this division, the Act only functioned to expand the geographical limits of the Resident Magistrate’s jurisdiction. As such, the provisions establishing the Resident Magistrate’s Division were also constitutionally valid.^[43]

Full Court Division
There are two issues of constitutionality on the with regard to the Full Court Division.^[44]

The practical consequence of the Gun Court Act is to confer upon a court made up of persons qualified and appointed as resident magistrates a jurisdiction which under the provisions of Chapter VII of the Constitution^[45] is exercisable only by a Supreme Court judge.^[46] This is held to be unconstitutional as this involves the transfer of jurisdiction from the higher judiciary to the lower judiciary by an ordinary act of the Parliament without prior amendment to the Constitution.^[47] This amounts to a transgression of the separation of powers and thus the provisions which confers jurisdiction to the Full Court Division are void.^[48]

The second ground arises only if the first ground fails.^[49] S 112 of the Constitution^[50] mandates that any assignment of a resident magistrate to sit in that division should be made by the Governor-General acting on the recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission. As the Full Court Division is a newly constituted court with no analogous existing courts, s 112^[51] applies. As such, the provision under the Act which provides that the Resident Magistrates can be appointed into this court by a Chief Justice, falls foul of s 112^[52].^[53] To this extent that it is inconsistent with the Constitution, the provisions conferring jurisdiction to the Resident Magistrates will be void.

4. Public Policy Consideration
Constitutional provisions are important safeguards entrenched by a machinery where they are not to be altered without the consent of a larger proportion of Parliamentary members than the bare majority required for ordinary laws. Thus, when concluding if any ordinary law passed by the Parliament of Jamaica is inconsistent with the Constitution, the courts are not concerned with the reasonableness or expediency of the law impugned. The sole consideration should be whether those provisions are with conflict with an entrenched provision of the Constitution.^[54]

5. Decision
In conclusion, the majority of the judges found that the provisions of the Act, to the extent which provided for the establishment of the Full Court Division, were void for being constitutionally invalid. This, however, did not affect the conviction of the appellants by the Resident Magistrate's Division since the Full Court Division provisions were severable from the Act. The case was remitted back to the Court of Appeal to decide on the sentences for the appellants.^[55]

Viscount Dilhourne and Lord Fraser of Tullybelton agreed that the Resident Magistrate’s Division and Circuit Court Division of the Gun Court were unconstitutional. However, they dissented with respect to the constitutionality of the Full Court Decision. Their opinions differed from the majority on the following points:

1. Implication of the doctrine of Separation of Powers into the Constitution

The minority raised the need for reverence to express provisions of the Constitution. They took the view that the purpose of having a written constitution is to make it easy to discern whether a particular legislative proposal contravenes the Constitution.^[56] Hence, there should not be a need to look beyond the express words of the Constitution. They observed that:

A written constitution must be construed like any other written document. It must be construed to give effect to the intentions of those who made and agreed to it and those intentions are expressed in or to be deduced from the terms of the constitution itself and not from any preconceived ideas as to what such a constitution should or should not contain.^[57]

Making implications will result in uncertainty and thus waste of time spent on legislating which turns out to be invalid.^[58] As such, there is no scope for the implication of the doctrine of Separation of Powers between the three organs of the government.

2. Ambit of Parliament’s legislative powers in transferring jurisdiction

The judges observed that the sections with which the Act is said to be inconsistent had not been identified. Chapter VII of the Constitution^[59] only deals with the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal, the Privy Council and the Judicial Service Commission, but does not provide that other courts created by Parliament are inconsistent with the Constitution. Hence, it was hard to find that the Act, in creating the Full Court, was void due to inconsistency pursuant to s 2 of the Constitution.

The judges agreed that the written constitution was evolutionary and not revolutionary. However, they opined that this did not mean that the distribution of judicial power could not be amended by Parliament.^[60] Section 97(1)^[61] and 97(4)^[62] explicitly gave the Parliament power to alter the powers and jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by ordinary legislation. Hence, Parliament can validly establish a new court with the same powers and jurisdiction through the Act without contravening the Constitution. This was unless the powers altered are expressly entrenched by the written words of the Constitution.^[63]

The judges also dissented on the point that the appointment or security of judges of a particular court will apply to all individual judges subsequently appointed to exercise an analogous jurisdiction. In interpreting s 98(3) of the Act^[64], they held that Parliament can reduce the qualifications, salary and conditions of service of a new Supreme Court judge to those of a Resident Magistrate without any Constitutional amendments. Conversely, there is no practical reason why a newly appointed Resident Magistrate should not be allowed to exercise the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court judge.^[65] A fortiori, the Act does not go to the extent of allowing a Resident Magistrate sitting in a Full Court Division to exercise the jurisdiction exercised by a Supreme Court judge, as its jurisdiction is limited to firearm offenses and other offenses committed by persons guilty of such offenses.

The minority also held that the appointment of a Resident Magistrate to sit in the Full Court does not contravene s 112(1) of the Constitution^[66]. This is because a Resident Magistrate sitting it a Full Court does not hold a new office and will not fall within the ambit of s 112(1), which requires appointment by the Governor-General on the advice of the Judicial Service Commission.^[67]

3. Transfer of judicial power
The judges held that the creation of the Full Court Division did not involve any transfer of judicial power to the Executive. On enactment of the Act, a Circuit Court can still deal with firearm offences and other offences committed by persons convicted of firearm offences. Hence, there was no reduction of the jurisdiction and powers of the Supreme Court.^[68]

4. Public policy considerations
The judges also deferred to policy considerations in reaching their decision. The rise in crimes of violence involving firearms was a serious concern. Hence, they felt that it must have been Parliament’s intention to confer such wide powers to the Full Court Division so as to deal with firearms offences with greater expediency. This was seen as an alternative to ease the case load of the Circuit Court in trying serious offences.

Moreover, if the Full Court Division was deemed unconstitutional, the Constitution had to be amended. This would result in a considerable delay of at least six months before the court could be established. This was not ideal as the establishment of the court was urgent.^[69]

The Privy Council held that the Act, in so far as it establishes the Full Court Division, improperly encroached on the jurisdiction reserved for the Supreme Court, and was thus unconstitutional. This was remedied in 1976 by replacing the Full Court division with a new High Court division, presided over by a single Supreme Court judge.^[70][71]Most significantly, Hinds stood for the principle that the separation of powers doctrine is implicit within Constitutions which adopted the Westminster model.

Mohammad Faizal bin Sabtu v. PP [2012] 4 SLR 947^[72] is a Singapore case raising the issue of whether s 33A(1)(a) of the Misuse of Drugs Act,^[73], in directing the court to treat Drug Rehabilitation Centre admissions (which were executive orders) as convictions (which were judicial orders) in order to imposed enhanced punishments on an offender, intruded into the judicial power of sentencing, thus violating the doctrine of separation of powers.

The Singapore High Court affirmed the doctrine of Separation of Powers set out by Lord Diplock in Hinds (at 212D-212E), stating that the Constitution of Singapore is based on the Westminster model and “[a]ll Constitutions based on the Westminster model incorporate the principle of Separation of Powers as part of their constitutional structure”^[74]. The court also opined that Parliament is the source of legislative power to enact offenses and prescribed punishments.^[75] It thus concluded that no written law of general application which prescribes punishment for an offence can trespass onto judicial power.

Citing Hinds, the court concluded that the following three types of cases were unconstitutional. The first type of cases involved factual situations like that of Hinds.

(a) first, cases involving legislation which enabled the Executive to actually select the sentence to be imposed in a particular case after the accused person was convicted by a court of law;

(b) second, cases involving legislation which enabled the Executive to make administrative decisions which were directly related to the charges brought against a particular accused person, and which had an impact on the actual sentence eventually imposed by a court of law; and

(c) third, cases involving legislation which enabled the Executive to make administrative decisions which were not directly related to any charges brought against a particular accused person at the time of those decision, but which had an impact on the actual sentence eventually imposed by a court of law pursuant to legislative directions that the Executive’s administrative decisions were a condition which limited to eliminated the court’s sentencing discretion”^[76]

Hinds was also cited in the Singapore case of Vellama d/o Marie Muthu v Attorney-General (“Vellama”).^[77] The issue was whether Art 49(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore ^[78]mandated a calling of election to fill the vacancy of an elected Member of Parliament.

The High Court judgment followed the principle in Hinds that the Constitution is to be ^[79] in light of its context and circumstances. It held that any interpretation of the Constitution had to begin with its text. If the text of the provision was unclear, extrinsic sources might be referred to in order to aid with the interpretation.^[80]

In construing the phrase “shall be filled by election” in Art 49(1)^[81], the court first looked within the context of Art 49 itself, then within the wider context of Pt VI of the Constitution which provided for the Legislature, and finally, within the context of the entire Constitution.^[82] It held that there was no requirement in the Constitution to call elections to fill elected Member vacancies.^[83]

The recent UK Privy Council case of Director of Public Prosecutions of Jamaica v Mollison [2003] UKPC 6,^[84] reaffirmed the doctrine of separation of powers as stated by Lord Diplock in Hinds:

“[the board] would be reluctant to depart from a decision which has stood unchallenged for 25 years, the more so since the decision gives effect to a very important and salutary principle. Whatever overlap there may be under constitutions on the Westminster model between the exercise of executive and legislative powers, the separation between the exercise of judicial powers on the one hand and legislative and executive powers on the other is total or effectively so.”^[85]

The case concerned the conviction of Mollison, who was sentenced to be detained during the Governor General's pleasure in accordance with section 29 of the Juveniles Act. ^[86] A person detained under section 29 was not deprived of his personal liberty by execution of a sentence determinable by court, or by order of court, but at the executive’s discretion.

The doctrine of separation of power was pivotal in allowing the court to find that section 29 of the Juveniles Act 1951 was incompatible to the constitutional principle of separation of powers. This was decided on the basis that judicial powers like sentencing must be exercised by the judiciary and not the executive. This led the court to conclude that with the power conferred by s 4(1) of the Jamaica (Constitution) Order in Council 1962, the court was to modify s 29 of the Juveniles Act to bring it into conformity with the Constitution.^[87]

The Equal Opportunity Act 2000 (“EOA”) seeks to prohibit discrimination on grounds of, amongst other things, sex, race, or disability in relation to employment and education in Trinidad and Tobago. Following a change of government, the act was not implemented as the new government felt that it was unconstitutional. The applicants, being victims of discrimination contrary to the prohibitions contained in the act, challenged the Government’s failure to implement the act.

Although their judgments differed, the board agreed that Hinds could be distinguished. It opined that unlike the Act in Hinds, the Equal Opportunity Act created new rights which were not subject to any existing jurisdiction.^[88] Lord Bingham of Cornhill held at [16]:

The EOA is directed to the redress of civil wrongs. The focus of the Act is on the creation of new rights. No jurisdiction is taken away from the High Court, save perhaps at the choice and with the consent of the complainant. The present case is not on all fours with Hinds.^[89]

The appeal was allowed. In addition to distinguishing Hinds, the majority gave other reasons for holding that the act was not inconsistent with the Constitution and implementation was required. First, the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago contemplated that judicial bodies other than the High Court might exercise judicial power. Next, given the limited jurisdiction exercised by the tribunal, the tribunal need not enjoy the exact same protection as that of the High Court. Finally, although the provisions impinged on qualified rights guaranteed by the Constitution, they pursued legitimate aims and were proportionate to them.

• O'Brien, Derek (2006), "The Caribbean Court of Justice and its Appellate Jurisdiction: A Difficult Birth", Public Law: 344.
• Lindermann Nelson, James (1980), "When rights and freedoms are violated", New Law Journal, 147: 858.
• Vyas, Yash (1992), "The Independence of the Judiciary: A Third World Perspective", Third World Legal Studies, 11: 127.

• Tan, Kevin Y[ew] L[ee]; Thio, Li-ann (2010), Constitutional Law in Malaysia and Singapore (3rd ed.), Singapore: LexisNexis, ISBN 978-981-236-795-2.
  • "The Judiciary", pp. 505–630.
• Thio, Li-ann (2012), A Treatise on Singapore Constitutional Law, Singapore: Academy Publishing, ISBN 978-981-07-1516-8.
  • "The Province of Constitutional Law", pp. 67–69.
  • "The Judiciary", pp. 451–567.
• Carolan, Eoin (2009), The New Separation of Powers: A Theory for the Modern State, Oxford; New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, ISBN 978-0-19-956867-3.

• Singapore Statutes Online