Baker v. Carr

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Baker v. Carr
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued April 19–20, 1961 Reargued October 9, 1961 Decided March 26, 1962
Full case name	Charles W. Baker et al. v. Joe. C. Carr et al.
Citations	369 U.S. 186 (more) 82 S. Ct. 691; 7 L. Ed. 2d 663; 1962 U.S. LEXIS 1567
Case history
Prior	179 F. Supp. 824 (M.D. Tenn. 1959), probable jurisdiction noted, 364 U.S. 898 (1960). Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee
Subsequent	On remand, 206 F. Supp. 341 (M.D. Tenn. 1962)
Holding
The redistricting of state legislative districts is not a political question. Therefore, cases related to the aforementioned are justiciable by the federal courts.
Court membership
Chief Justice Earl Warren Associate Justices Hugo Black · Felix Frankfurter William O. Douglas · Tom C. Clark John M. Harlan II · William J. Brennan Jr. Charles E. Whittaker · Potter Stewart
Case opinions
Majority	Brennan, joined by Warren, Black, Douglas, Clark, Stewart
Concurrence	Douglas
Concurrence	Clark
Concurrence	Stewart
Dissent	Frankfurter, joined by Harlan
Dissent	Harlan, joined by Frankfurter
Whittaker took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Laws applied
U.S. Const. amend. XIV; U.S. Const. art. III; 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Tenn. Const. art. II
This case overturned a previous ruling or rulings
Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946) (in part)

Wikisource has original text related to this article:

Baker v. Carr

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), was a landmark United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that redistricting qualifies as a justiciable question under the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause, thus enabling federal courts to hear Fourteenth Amendment-based redistricting cases. The court summarized its Baker holding in a later decision as follows: "the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits the authority of a State Legislature in designing the geographical districts from which representatives are chosen either for the State Legislature or for the Federal House of Representatives." (Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963)). The court had previously held in Gomillion v. Lightfoot that districting claims over racial discrimination could be brought under the Fifteenth Amendment.

The case arose from a lawsuit against the state of Tennessee, which had not conducted redistricting since 1901. Tennessee argued that the composition of legislative districts constituted a nonjusticiable political question, as the U.S. Supreme Court had held in Colegrove v. Green (1946). In a majority opinion joined by five other justices, Justice William J. Brennan Jr. held that redistricting did not qualify as a political question, though he remanded the case to the federal district court for further proceedings. Justice Felix Frankfurter strongly dissented, arguing that the Court's decision cast aside history and judicial restraint and violated the separation of powers between legislatures and courts.

The case did not have any immediate effect on electoral districts, but it set an important precedent regarding the power of federal courts to address redistricting. In 1964, the Supreme Court handed down two cases, Wesberry v. Sanders and Reynolds v. Sims, that required the United States House of Representatives and state legislatures to establish electoral districts of equal population on the principle of one person, one vote.

Plaintiff Charles Baker was a Republican who lived in Shelby County, Tennessee, and had served as the mayor of Millington, near Memphis.^[1] The Tennessee State Constitution required that the Tennessee General Assembly's legislative districts be redrawn every ten years to provide for districts of substantially equal population (as was to be done for congressional districts). Baker's complaint was that Tennessee had not redistricted since 1901, in response to the 1900 census.

By the time of Baker's lawsuit, the population had shifted such that his district in Shelby County had about ten times as many residents as some of the rural districts. Rural citizens' votes were thus overrepresented compared to those of urban citizens. Baker's argument was that this discrepancy was causing him to fail to receive the "equal protection of the laws" the Fourteenth Amendment requires. Defendant Joe Carr was sued in his position as Tennessee Secretary of State. Carr was not the person who set the district lines – the state legislature had done that – but was sued ex officio as the person ultimately responsible for the conduct of elections in the state and the publication of district maps.

Tennessee argued that the composition of legislative districts was essentially a political question, not a judicial one, as had been held by Colegrove v. Green,^[2] a plurality opinion of the Court in which Justice Felix Frankfurter declared that "Courts ought not to enter this political thicket." Frankfurter believed that relief for legislative malapportionment had to be won through the political process.^[3]

The case had to be put over for reargument because in conference no clear majority emerged for either side of the case. During the case, Justice Charles Evans Whittaker recused himself for health reasons, ultimately retiring from the Court in 1962.^[4]

The opinion was finally handed down in March 1962, nearly a year after it was initially argued. The Court split 6 to 2 in ruling that Baker's case was justiciable, producing, in addition to the opinion of the Court by Justice William J. Brennan, three concurring opinions and two dissenting opinions. Brennan reformulated the political question doctrine, identifying six factors to help in determining which questions are "political" in nature. Cases that are political in nature are marked by:

1. "Textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department"; as an example, Brennan cited issues of foreign affairs and executive war powers, arguing that cases involving such matters would be "political questions"
2. "A lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it";
3. "The impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion";
4. "The impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government";
5. "An unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made"; and
6. "The potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question."

Justice Tom C. Clark switched his vote at the last minute to a concurrence on the substance of Baker's claims, which would have enabled a majority that could have granted relief for Baker. Instead, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the District Court.

The large majority in this case can in many ways be attributed to Brennan, who convinced Justice Potter Stewart that the case was a narrow ruling dealing only with the right to challenge the statute. Brennan also talked down Justices Hugo Black and William O. Douglas from their usual absolutist positions to achieve a compromise.^[5]

Frankfurter, joined by Justice John Marshall Harlan II, dissented vigorously and at length, arguing that the Court had cast aside history and judicial restraint, and violated the separation of powers between legislatures and Courts.^[6] He wrote:

Appellants invoke the right to vote and to have their votes counted. But they are permitted to vote and their votes are counted. They go to the polls, they cast their ballots, they send their representatives to the state councils. Their complaint is simply that the representatives are not sufficiently numerous or powerful.

United States federal civil procedure doctrines
Justiciability
Advisory opinions Standing Ripeness Mootness Political questions Constitutional avoidance
Jurisdiction
Subject-matter Federal question Diversity Amount in controversy Supplemental Removal Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 Personal In personam In rem Quasi in rem
Federalism
Erie doctrine Abstention Anti-Injunction Act Sovereign immunity Abrogation Rooker–Feldman doctrine Adequate and independent state ground
v t e

Having declared redistricting issues justiciable in Baker, the court laid out a new test for evaluating such claims. The Court formulated the famous "one person, one vote" standard under American jurisprudence for legislative redistricting, holding that every person had to be weighted equally in legislative apportionment. This affected numerous state legislatures that had not redistricted congressional districts for decades, despite major population shifts. It also ultimately affected the composition of state legislative districts, which in Alabama and many other states had overrepresented rural districts and underrepresented urban districts with much greater populations.

This principle was formally enunciated in Reynolds v. Sims (1964). The Court decided that in states with bicameral legislatures, like Alabama, the state in this case, both houses had to be apportioned on this standard. This voided the Alabama Constitution's provision for two state senators from each county and similar provisions elsewhere. Similarly, the Tennessee Constitution prevented counties from being split and portions of a county from being attached to other counties or parts of counties in creating a legislative district. This was overridden on the principle of basing districts on population. Today counties are frequently split among districts in forming Tennessee State Senate districts. "One person, one vote" was first applied as a standard for Congressional districts in Wesberry v. Sanders. State legislatures were supposed to redistrict according to population changes, but many had not for decades.

Baker v. Carr and subsequent cases fundamentally changed the nature of political representation in the United States, requiring not just Tennessee but nearly every state to redistrict during the 1960s, often several times. This reapportionment increased urban areas' political power and reduced that of more rural areas.^[7] After he left the Court, Chief Justice Earl Warren called the Baker v. Carr line of cases the most important in his tenure as Chief.^[8]

• List of United States Supreme Court cases, volume 369

• Eisler, Kim Isaac (1993). A Justice for All: William J. Brennan, Jr., and the decisions that transformed America. New York: Simon & Schuster. ISBN 0-671-76787-9.
• Gifford, Donald G. (2010). Suing the Tobacco and Lead Pigment Industries: Government Litigation as Public Health Prescription. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. p. 318. ISBN 978-0-472-11714-7.
• Peltason, Jack W. (1992). "Baker v. Carr". In Hall, Kermit L. (ed.). The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 67–70. ISBN 0-19-505835-6.
• Tushnet, Mark (2008). I dissent: Great Opposing Opinions in Landmark Supreme Court Cases. Boston: Beacon Press. pp. 151–166. ISBN 978-0-8070-0036-6.

• Text of Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) is available from: Google Scholar Justia Library of Congress Oyez (oral argument audio)
• Baker v. Carr Case Brief, Lawnix.com
• "Supreme Court Landmark Case Baker v. Carr" from C-SPAN's Landmark Cases: Historic Supreme Court Decisions
• The Political Thicket a podcast episode on the case from Radiolab More Perfect, WNYC Studios