Fiscal Solvency and Fiscal Forecasting in Europe

Michael Artis and Massimiliano Marcellino

No 1836, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This paper analyses two features of concern to policy-makers in the countries of the prospective European Monetary Union: the solvency of their government’s finances; and the accuracy of fiscal forecasts. Extending the existing methodology of solvency tests, the paper finds that, with few exceptions, EU governments are insolvent, albeit debt/GDP ratios show signs of stabilizing. The accuracy of official short-term fiscal forecasts (those of the OECD) is analysed, using conventional techniques, and found to be reassuring.

Keywords: Deficits; Fiscal Policy; Forecast Accuracy; Maasticht treaty; Solvency; stability and growth pact (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C22 D99 E62 H63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-03
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (36)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Fiscal Solvency and Fiscal Forecasting in Europe (1998)
Working Paper: Fiscal Solvency and Fiscal Forecasting in Europe
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