Bayesianism without Learning

Dov Samet

Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: According to the standard definition, a Bayesian agent is one who forms his posterior belief by conditioning his prior belief on what he has learned, that is, on facts of which he has become certain. Here it is shown that Bayesianism can be described without assuming that the agent acquires any certain information; an agent is Bayesian if his prior, when conditioned on his posterior belief, agrees with the latter. This condition is shown to characterize Bayesian models.

Keywords: Bayesian updating; prior and posterior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D80 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 1999-02-23
Note: Type of Document - ; pages: 17
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Journal Article: Bayesianism without learning (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9902004

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