Do Polls Create Momentum in Political Campaigns?

No 1326, Economics Working Paper Series from University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science

Abstract: We explore how public opinion polls affect candidates' campaign spending in political competition. Generally, polls lead to (more) asymmetric behavior. Under a majority rule there always exists an equilibrium in which the initially more popular candidate invests more in the campaign and thereby increases her lead in expectation: polls create momentum. When campaigning is very effective and the race is very close, a second type of equilibrium may exist: the trailing candidate outspends and overtakes his opponent. Regardless of the type of equilibrium, polls have a tendency to decrease expected total campaigning expenditures by amplifying ex-ante asymmetries between candidates and thus defusing competition. When candidates care also for their vote share in addition to having the majority, candidates' incentives crucially depend on the distribution of voters' candidate preferences.

Keywords: Polls; political campaigns; feedback; momentum (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D72 D74 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 70 pages
Date: 2013-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:usg:econwp:2013:26

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