Stigmatization, Liability and Public Enforcement of Law

Clemens Buchen, Bruno Deffains and Alberto Palermo

Revue d'économie politique, 2019, vol. 129, issue 2, 235-259

Abstract: In the theory of public enforcement of law the choice of the liability rules is between strict liability and fault-based liability. In this paper, we study the determinants of compliance when in addition to standard economic incentives wrongdoers take into account stigmatization costs. In this context, this cost is not simply a transfer of resources. We show that a non-guiltiness standard ? the fault standard equal to the deterrence level ? is never optimal. In this scenario, we show how the optimal policy choice depends on the interplay between the magnitude of the harm and the stigmatization cost. Classification JEL: K13, K42, D62

Keywords: stigmatization; liability; public enforcement of law; regulatory offenses; legal standard; stigmatisation; règles de responsabilité; respect des normes juridiques; infractions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D62 K13 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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