The Attack and Defense Games

Roman Sheremeta ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The attack and defense game is a game in which an attacker (a group of attackers) has an incentive to revise the status quo and a defender (a group of defenders) wants to protect it. The asymmetry in objectives creates incompatible interests and results in a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. However, this equilibrium could be heavily impacted by behavioral considerations.

Keywords: contest; attack; defense; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-ore
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/95747/1/MPRA_paper_95747.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: The Attack and Defense Games (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:95747

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