Towards a tacit low-degree independence central banking model ?

Bertrand Blancheton

Cahiers du GREThA (2007-2019) from Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée (GREThA)

Abstract: This article puts the independence of central banks into historical perspective. In doing so, it underlines the highly versatile nature of the balance of forces between central banks and governments. From this viewpoint, the situation of public finances emerges as a key explanatory factor, and an analysis of the sequence of central banking models is proposed from the late 19th century to the present day. The article upholds the thesis of the emergence, since the subprime crisis, of a new model qualified as “tacit low-degree independence”: central banks have, of their own volition, given up some of their de facto independence, helping governments to contain the rise in national debt. But while keeping a step ahead of pressure from governments, they have lost the control of money supply.

Keywords: central banking; public debt; central bank independence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G20 N10 N20 N40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-his and nep-mon
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:grt:wpegrt:2015-17

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