Formal Models of Elections and Political Bargaining
Norman Schofield () and
Ugur Ozdemir
Czech Economic Review, 2009, vol. 3, issue 3, 207-242
Abstract:
The key theoretical idea in this paper is that activist groups contribute resources to their favored parties in response to policy concessions from the parties. These resources are then used by a party to enhance the leader’s valence — the electoral perception of the quality of the party leader. The equilibrium result is that parties, in order to maximize vote share, will balance a centripetal electoral force against a centrifugal activist effect. Under proportional electoral rule, there need be no pressure for activist groups to coalesce, leading to multiple political parties. Under plurality rule, however, small parties face the possibility of extinction. An activist group linked to a small party in such a polity has little expectation of influencing government policy. The paper illustrates these ideas by considering recent elections in Turkey, Britain and the United States, as well as a number of European polities.
Keywords: Election; plurality rule; proportional representation; activist groups (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H10 H11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://auco.cuni.cz/mag/article/download/id/70/type/attachment (application/pdf)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fau:aucocz:au2009_207
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://auco.cuni.cz/
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in Czech Economic Review from Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Lenka Stastna ().