Learning by Helping: A Bounded Rationality Model of Mentoring

Mahmood Arai, Antoine Billot () and Joseph Lanfranchi

No 1999:14, Research Papers in Economics from Stockholm University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Within an organization, a bounded rational principal organizes a promotion test based on a sequence of test regarding candidates' relative performances. We assume the principal to suffer from limited ability to rank the performances, only identifying the best in each test. Furthermore, he satisfies the expected gains do not decreases whit the information generated by additional tests. Then, mentoring is shown to improve the information about candidates' ability when the principal offers help to the current best candidate provided by a manager promoted after a similar contest.

Keywords: Mentoring; Selection; Contests; Bounded Rationality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D10 D83 L22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 1999-10-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ind, nep-mic and nep-tid
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http://www2.ne.su.se/paper/wp99_14.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Learning by helping: a bounded rationality model of mentoring (2001)
Working Paper: Learning by helping: a bounded rationality model of mentoring (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:sunrpe:1999_0014

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