Promoting renewable electricity generation in imperfect markets: price vs. quantity policies

Reinhard Madlener, Weiyu Gao, Ilja Neustadt and Peter Zweifel ()
Additional contact information
Weiyu Gao: Shanghai Development Research Center
Peter Zweifel: Socioeconomic Institute, University of Zurich

No 809, SOI - Working Papers from Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich

Abstract: The search for economically efficient policy instruments designed to promote the diffusion of renewable energy technologies in liberalized markets has led to the introduction of quota-based tradable ‘green’ certificate (TGC) schemes for renewable electricity. However, there is a debate about the pros and cons of TGC, a quantity control policy, compared to guaranteed feed-in tariffs, a price control policy. In this paper we contrast these two alternatives in terms of social welfare, taking into account that electricity markets are not perfectly competitive, and show that the price control policy dominates the quantity control policy in terms of social welfare.

Keywords: Tradable green certificates; Renewable portfolio standard; Quota target; Feed-in tariff; Cournot duopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q42 Q48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2008-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ene and nep-env
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/52396/1/wp0809.pdf revised version, 2009 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Promoting Renewable Electricity Generation in Imperfect Markets: Price vs. Quantity Policies (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:soz:wpaper:0809

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in SOI - Working Papers from Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Severin Oswald ().