Positive value of information in games

Bruno Bassan (), Olivier Gossner, Marco Scarsini and Shmuel Zamir ()

Discussion Paper Series from The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem

Abstract: We exhibit a general class of interactive decision situations in which all the agents benefit from more information. This class includes as a special case the classical comparison of statistical experiments `a la Blackwell. More specifically, we consider pairs consisting of a game with incomplete information G and an information structure S such that the extended game (G,S) has a unique Pareto payoff profile u. We prove that u is a Nash payoff profile of (G,S), and that for any information structure T that is coarser than S, all Nash payoff profiles of (G,S) are dominated by u. We then prove that our condition is also necessary in the following sense: Given any convex compact polyhedron of payoff profiles, whose Pareto frontier is not a singleton, there exists an extended game (G,S) with that polyhedron as the convex hull of feasible payoffs, an information structure T coarser than S and a player i who strictly prefers a Nash equilibrium in (G,S) to any Nash equilibrium in (G,S).

Keywords: Information structures; Value of Information; Pareto Optima (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2001-02, Revised 2002-07
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Published in International Journal of Game Theory, 2003, vol. 32, pp. 17-31.

Downloads: (external link)
http://ratio.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/publications/dp294.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://ratio.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/publications/dp294.pdf [302 Moved Temporarily]--> https://ratio.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/publications/dp294.pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Positive value of information in games (2003)
Working Paper: Positive value of information in games (2003)
Working Paper: Positive value of information in games (2003)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:huj:dispap:dp294

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Paper Series from The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael Simkin ().